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In recent years, members of Congress have
inserted thousands of pork-barrel spending proj-
ects into bills to reward interests in their home
states. But such parochial pork is only a small part
of a broader problem of rising federal spending on
traditionally state and local activities.
Federal spending on aid to the states increased
from $286 billion in fiscal 2000 to an estimated
$449 billion in fiscal 2007 and is the third-largest
item in the federal budget after Social Security
and national defense. The number of different aid
programs for the states soared from 463 in 1990,
to 653 in 2000, to 814 by 2006. 
The theory behind aid to the states is that fed-
eral policymakers can design and operate pro-
grams in the national interest to efficiently solve
local problems. In practice, most federal politi-
cians are not inclined to pursue broad, national
goals; they are consumed by the competitive
scramble to secure subsidies for their states. At
the same time, federal aid stimulates overspend-
ing by the states, requires large bureaucracies to
administer, and comes with a web of complex
regulations that limit state flexibility. 
At all levels of the aid system, the focus is on
spending and regulations, not on delivering
quality services. And by involving all levels of
government in just about every policy area, the
aid system creates a lack of accountability. When
every government is responsible for an activity,
no government is responsible, as was evident in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
The failings of federal aid have long been rec-
ognized, but reforms and cuts have not been pur-
sued for years. Aid has spawned a web of inter-
locking interests that block reform, including
elected officials at three levels of government,
armies of government employees, and thousands
of trade associations representing the recipients
of aid. 
Yet the system desperately needs to be scaled
back, not least because the rising costs of federal
programs for the elderly are putting a squeeze on
the federal budget. To help spur reform, this
study examines the historical growth of the aid
system and describes its failings. Congress
should reconsider the need for aid and begin ter-
minating activities that could be better per-
formed by state and local governments and the
private sector.
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Introduction
Under the Constitution, the federal govern-
ment has specific limited powers and most gov-
ernment functions are left to the states. Federal
powers enumerated in the Constitution
include those aimed at providing national secu-
rity and those designed to ensure an open
national economy. To make sure that people
understood the limits on federal power, the
Framers added the Constitution’s Tenth
Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people.” 
The Tenth Amendment embodies federal-
ism, the idea that federal and state governments
each have separate areas of activity and that fed-
eral responsibilities are “few and defined,” as
James Madison noted. Historically, federalism
acted as a safeguard of American freedoms. As
President Ronald Reagan noted in a 1987 exec-
utive order, “Federalism is rooted in the knowl-
edge that our political liberties are best assured
by limiting the size and scope of the national
government.”1
Unfortunately, policymakers and courts
in recent decades have discarded federalism.
Congress has undertaken many activities
that were traditionally reserved to the states
and the private sector. The Supreme Court
has embraced looser readings of the limits on
federal power over time. Indeed, after a num-
ber of troubling Court decisions in the 1980s,
a government commission on intergovern-
mental relations concluded that the rulings
overturned “the long-standing doctrine that
the federal government is one of limited, del-
egated power, thus opening the way for virtu-
ally unfettered exercises of national power
vis-à-vis the states and local governments.”2
Federal power has continued to expand
under the administration of George W. Bush.
Today, federal spending and regulatory activity
are directed to nearly any state and local activi-
ty that suits the whims of Congress and execu-
tive branch agencies. 
The primary means that the federal govern-
ment uses to intervene in state activities are
grants-in-aid and accompanying regulations.
Grants-in-aid (“grants” or “aid”) are subsidies to
state and local governments aimed at promoting
particular activities such as highway building.
Federal granting began during the late 19th cen-
tury, expanded during the early 20th century, and
ballooned during the 1960s. Today, more than
800 federal grant programs shower the states
with hundreds of billions of dollars each year. 
What are the practical effects of this torrent
of aid and how has it altered the structure of
American government? This study looks at
the role of policymakers and bureaucrats in
the growth of aid and focuses on the failings
of aid, which have been evident to policy ex-
perts for decades. Federal aid has generated in-
tense spending pressures and excess bureauc-
racy at all three levels of government. 
Figure 1 illustrates the interlocking parts of
the federal aid system. Federal politicians create
programs that deliver funding to, and impose
regulations on, state and local governments.
Those governments then consume a portion of
aid in employee wages and other administrative
costs and hand out billions of dollars to private-
sector grantees and contractors. State and local
employees and private organizations, which
benefit from aid, create unions and trade asso-
ciations to lobby Congress and promote higher
spending to the public.
The following sections discuss how these
parts of the aid system work together to gen-
erate bigger government. The first section pro-
vides a history of federal aid and presents data
on the expansion in the number of programs.
Then the roles of federal and state politicians
and lobbyists are examined. That is followed
by a discussion of the bureaucracies in the
three levels of government that distribute aid
and deal with regulations. The conclusion
summarizes why aid should be a priority tar-
get for federal budget cuts.
Federal Aid Has Grown
Massive and Complex
Prior to the Civil War, proposals to provide
federal subsidies for state and local activities
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were occasionally introduced in Congress, but
they were routinely voted down or vetoed by
presidents for being unconstitutional. In 1817
President James Madison vetoed a bill that
would have provided federal aid to construct
roads and canals.3 In 1830 President Andrew
Jackson vetoed a bill to provide aid for a road
project in Kentucky arguing that it was of
“purely local character” and that funding
would be a “subversion of the federal system.”4
In 1854 President Franklin Pierce vetoed a bill
that would have provided aid to the states for
the indigent insane, also citing federalism rea-
sons. 
Spending was dispersed in the states as a
side effect of federal activities such as troop
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deployments and Post Office services.5 And
the federal government approved grants of
land to the states for schools, roads, and
canal projects. Congress approved funding
from the proceeds of land sales to construct
the historic National Road in 1806.6 But in
1822 President James Monroe vetoed legisla-
tion for funding maintenance of the road
because of constitutional concerns about
federal overreach. (The National Road was
handed over to the states in the 1830s.)
However, there were no grant programs
that disbursed cash to the states for ongoing
activities. That started to change toward the
end of the 19th century. The Morrill Act of
1862 provided grants of federal land to the
states for the establishment of colleges that
focused on agriculture, mechanical studies,
and the military. That was the first grant pro-
gram with “strings attached.” It included
detailed rules for recipients to follow, and it
required them to submit regular reports to
the federal government. (An earlier version of
the Morrill bill in 1859 raised a storm of
protest about its constitutionality, and it was
vetoed by President James Buchanan.)7
In 1879 Congress provided funds to a pri-
vate nonprofit group in order to distribute to
the states educational materials for the blind.
In 1887 the Hatch Act, the first cash grant
program, provided subsidies to the states for
agricultural research.8 An 1888 act provided
aid to the states for veterans’ homes. A sec-
ond Morrill Act in 1890 began regular appro-
priations for the land-grant colleges.
Federal aid activity increased substantially
in the early 20th century. The “dual federal-
ism” of the 19th century was being replaced by
what became called “cooperative federalism.”
When the income tax was introduced in 1913,
it provided the means for policymakers to
finance a large range of new federal aid pro-
grams. Here are some of the early aid laws:9
• The Weeks Act of 1911 provided aid to
the states for forest fire prevention.
• The Smith-Lever Act of 1914 provided
subsidies to land-grant colleges for agri-
cultural education. 
• The Federal Aid Roads Act of 1916 pro-
vided aid to the states to build high-
ways, based on the premise that road
funding supported federal mail delivery.
The federal government had not provid-
ed funding to the states for roads since
the subsidies for the National Road had
ended in the 1830s. 
• The Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 created
grants for teacher salaries and teacher
training in vocational education.
• The Chamberlain-Kahn Act of 1918
provided aid to the states for combating
venereal disease.
• The Fess-Kenyon Act of 1920 provided
aid to the states for vocational rehabili-
tation, or the training of persons who
had been disabled in industry.
• The Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921 pro-
vided aid to the states “for the promotion
of the welfare and hygiene of maternity
and infancy.”
Those seven early aid programs had fea-
tures and faults that were similar to those of
today’s aid programs. All seven programs
required the states to match federal funds on a
dollar-for-dollar basis—federal aid was called
the “fifty-fifty system.” As discussed below,
matching requirements induce excess spend-
ing and divert state-source funds from other,
perhaps higher, priorities of each state. If states
are induced to spend more of their funds on
farm subsidies, for example, they may have less
to spend on their justice systems. 
The new aid programs usually mandated
an expansion in state and local bureaucracies.
Aid programs required the states to set up new
boards and agencies to oversee government
spending on the prescribed activities. The
1916 act required states to create highway
departments; the 1917 act required the states
to establish vocational education boards; the
1921 act required states to create children’s
bureaus; and so on. The states had to create
detailed plans for their activities, file regular
reports to Washington, and be subject to
inspection by federal officials regarding their
use of aid funds. Regarding the 1916 Roads
4
When the 
income tax was
introduced in
1913, it provided
the means for 
policymakers to
finance a large
range of new 
federal aid 
programs.
339907 Pa593_1stclass.qxp  5/9/2007  12:22 PM  Page 4
Act, a contemporary observer noted that it
required the states to send a “vast amount of
detailed information” to Washington.10
There were other strings attached to the
early aid programs. People began noticing
that by funding just a portion of state activi-
ties, the federal government was gaining con-
trol over state policy in certain areas. For
example, through aid the federal government
began influencing the employment policies
of the states.11 And in order to receive aid,
states were often required to pass legislation
that regulated state and local activities in
ways sought by Congress. For example, a
highway aid act in 1921 brought pressure on
the states to increase the powers of their
highway departments and expand controls
over local road-building activities.12
Various sleights of hand were used to get
around constitutional concerns about expand-
ed federal power. Funding for the 1890 Morrill
Act was supposed to come from the proceeds of
federal land sales in the states, which was long-
standing practice, but in practice the funds
came from regular appropriations. The 1916
road subsidy law aimed to fund “post roads,” or
those that were used for federal mail delivery,
but Congress defined that extremely broadly.13
The 1911 aid bill was supposed to fund state
forest fire prevention only near navigable rivers,
and that provided a constitutional pretence for
those activities as being related to interstate
commerce.14
Figure 2 shows the number of aid pro-
grams for the states beginning with the educa-
tion program of 1879. By 1930 there were 15
federal aid programs. As Congress added and
expanded programs, the budget costs rose.
Figure 3 shows that aid jumped from less than
1 percent of federal spending to more than 3
percent during the 1920s. The costliest aid
activity at that time was highway funding.
It was getting harder to hold the line on
federalism as politicians became increasingly
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Number of Federal Aid Programs for the States
Sources: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, “Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System,” vol. 1, October 1967; and Office of
Management and Budget, Budget Systems and Analysis Division, “The Number of Federal Grant Programs to State and Local Governments: 1980 to
2004,” unpublished, April 8, 2005. The 2006 figure is author’s estimate based on OMB methodology.
Note: The ACIR data for 1980 through 1995 show about 60 more programs, on average, than the OMB data.
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activist and new lobbying groups were estab-
lished. Labor unions pushed for federal fund-
ing of vocational education and succeeded
with the passage of the Smith-Hughes Act in
1917. The passage of the 1916 road bill was
preceded by the introduction of at least 62 dif-
ferent road subsidy bills in Congress.15 State
highway officials had formed a national orga-
nization in 1914 with an office in Washington
to press for aid, and highway lobbying groups
helped draft the 1916 bill.16
Nonetheless, there was resistance to the
growth in aid, and the shortcomings of aid
programs were already becoming evident.17
President Calvin Coolidge was a frequent and
pointed critic of the aid system. In his budget
message for 1926, Coolidge declared: 
I am convinced that the broadening of
this field of activity is detrimental both to
the federal and state governments. Effi-
ciency of federal operations is impaired as
their scope is unduly enlarged. Efficiency
of state governments is impaired as they
relinquish and turn over to the federal
government responsibilities which are
rightfully theirs. I am opposed to any
expansion of these subsidies. My convic-
tion is that they can be curtailed with ben-
efit, to both the federal and state govern-
ments.18
Some leaders in the higher-income East
Coast states strongly opposed expansions in
aid. Gov. Albert Ritchie of Maryland said that
the “system ought to be abolished, root and
branch” with the money “left in the states for
the states to use for their own local needs and
purposes.”19 But the less-populated states
used their disproportionate power in the
Senate to vote for aid programs knowing that
their states would receive large benefits while
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paying only a small part of the costs.20
Proponents of aid were persistent, and, as
aid bills began to pass, new interest groups were
formed and Congress began getting bombard-
ed with requests for subsidies of all kinds.21 A
few states initially refused to take part in some
of the aid programs, but an observer at the time
said that most states “to get a few millions they
shamelessly barter away their birthright” of
reserved powers under the Constitution.22 Of
course, it was politically difficult for states to
opt out of federal subsidy programs because, if
they did, their residents would still have to pay
federal taxes to support the subsidies paid to
other states.
By the time President Franklin Roosevelt
came to office, many legal and political prece-
dents had already been set for the large expan-
sions in aid enacted under the New Deal. In
the 1930s aid programs were created for pub-
lic housing, welfare, employment, and many
other activities. The Federal Emergency Relief
Act of 1933 provided more than $3 billion to
the states over two years for work relief.23 The
main federal aid program for welfare, Aid to
Dependent Children, was enacted in 1935. 
By 1940 the number of federal aid pro-
grams had increased to 30, and aid spending
had soared to 9.2 percent of the federal budget.
By 1945 aid had fallen as a share of the budget
because defense spending had pushed overall
spending up. Figure 4 shows federal aid to the
states in constant dollars. It indicates that aid
spending was fairly flat during the 1940s.
Federal aid expanded during the 1950s,
with the number of aid programs almost dou-
bling from 68 in 1950 to 132 by 1960. That
expansion occurred despite President Dwight
Eisenhower’s expressed concerns about feder-
alism. Eisenhower had established a commis-
sion in 1953 to identify federal activities that
could be returned to the states, but unfortu-
nately no reforms were enacted.24 The largest
new grant program during this era was the
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Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, which au-
thorized $25 billion of spending over a decade
on the interstate highway system. 
The Highway Act provides an illustration
of how federal regulatory controls started
coming as a package deal with federal dollars.
The act imposed on all state highway projects
that received federal money Davis-Bacon rules,
which mandated that construction workers be
paid “prevailing wages.” That usually had the
effect of increasing labor costs on projects at
taxpayer expense. Because many states were
already constructing their own highway sys-
tems in the mid-1950s, one effect of the 1956
act was to increase the costs of many highways
that would have been built anyway.
Federal aid exploded during the 1960s.
Figure 2 shows that the number of aid pro-
grams quadrupled from 132 in 1960 to 530 by
1970. Under President Lyndon Johnson, new
aid programs were added for housing, urban
renewal, education, health care, environmental
protection, and many other activities. The
Congressional Research Service noted that
“more grant programs were enacted during the
Johnson Administration (1963–69) than in all
preceding years in U.S. history combined.”25
There were 109 separate aid programs for the
states enacted in 1965 alone.26
Aid spending rose from $48 billion in 1960
to $129 billion by 1970, measured in constant
2007 dollars. President Johnson called his
policies “creative federalism,” but his activism
dealt a severe blow to the federalism of the
nation’s Founders. By the end of the 1960s,
many policymakers believed that the federal
government should spend money on just
about any activity that it wanted, and ques-
tions regarding constitutional propriety were
seldom considered anymore. 
The huge growth in federal aid in the 1960s
occurred for many reasons. Policymakers were
fooled by the mirage that “federal resources”
appeared to be limitless compared to the tax
revenues available to individual states. Of
course, the ultimate source of the federal
money distributed to the states is the taxpayers
who live in the 50 states, but policymakers have
always ignored this inconvenient truth.
Many policymakers and academics sup-
port aid to the states because they see it as a
way to advance the cause of wealth redistrib-
ution. Liberals prefer that government pro-
grams be funded at the federal level because
the federal tax system is more graduated, or
“progressive,” than state tax systems. A schol-
ar of federal aid, Howard Chernick of Hunter
College, New York, begins one of his studies
on aid with a view common in academia:
In a decentralized federal system such as
the United States, the realization of dis-
tributional goals requires the joint fiscal
effort and cooperation of several layers
of government. If fiscal responsibility
for redistribution were left entirely to
subnational levels of government, then
states with weak fiscal capacity or limit-
ed preferences for redistribution might
choose benefits and levels of access that
fall below minimum national standards
of adequacy.27
In Chernick’s view, apparently, it is imper-
missible for any state to have less of a prefer-
ence for redistribution than Washington
deems appropriate. Chernick presents the
problem of “weak fiscal capacity” as an
unavoidable disease that states cannot fix by
themselves with pro-growth economic policies.
Congress needs to step in and create “mini-
mum national standards” because some states
are hopelessly weak and likely to make poor
choices if left to themselves. These sorts of
views have been popular among proponents of
aid since the beginning of the aid system.  
The views of advocates of aid are infused
with a belief in the “public interest theory of
government,” which is the idea that policy-
makers act with the best interests of the broad
general public in mind. In past decades, con-
ventional wisdom held that the federal gov-
ernment could be effective and efficient at
solving local problems. Are there poor people
and blighted buildings in your city? Let us use
the seemingly unlimited resources of the fed-
eral government to hire experts, bulldoze the
blight, and build modern high-rises to solve
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the problem. That type of top-down thinking
was behind the creation of aid programs for
urban renewal, housing, education, and many
other activities. 
We know today that the federal govern-
ment is not very good at solving local prob-
lems, and fewer scholars believe in the public
interest theory of government. Even casual
observation of Congress reveals that policy-
makers put the various narrow interests of
their states above all else most of the time.
Aid is the perfect tool to satisfy parochial spe-
cial interests, and that is why the aid empire
prospers today—not because experts believe
that it works well.
Growing Aid, Growing Problems
The unchallenged optimism of the 1960s
about the federal government’s ability to solve
state and local problems did not last. By the
late 1960s, budget analysts were becoming
alarmed at the growing complexity and over-
lap of federal grants. Two of President
Johnson’s top economic advisers and other
experts began to push for consolidation of
narrow “categorical” grants into broader and
more flexible “block” grants.28
Categorical grants fund a narrow range of
eligible activities subject to detailed federal
rules that state governments are required to
follow. Until the 1960s, all grants were cate-
gorical grants, and the vast majority still are.
Categorical grants are very complex, and as far
back as the Hoover Commission in 1949
experts had proposed replacing them with
block grants.29 Block grants generally have
simpler rules and allow the states more flexi-
bility. Both Presidents Harry Truman and
Dwight Eisenhower proposed block grants,
but those reforms were not enacted.30
Congress passed the first block grant in
1966, which converted 16 existing health care
grants into a single broader program. A block
grant for law enforcement was enacted in
1968. But those small reforms were over-
whelmed by the avalanche of new categorical
grants being enacted in the late 1960s. The
number of programs seems to have reached a
temporary peak in the early 1970s and then
declined for a few years as the pace of program
creation slowed and some existing programs
were consolidated. According to data from the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, the number of programs declined
to about 447 by 1975, then began climbing
again to reach roughly 500 by 1980. However,
different ACIR reports show somewhat differ-
ent program counts during this period.
While fewer new programs were added
during the 1970s, the cost of aid programs
soared as spending on all the programs creat-
ed during the 1960s kicked into overdrive.
Figure 4 shows that spending on aid for both
health and nonhealth programs roughly
doubled during the 1970s, measured in con-
stant dollars.  
President Richard Nixon took some modest
steps toward consolidating the burgeoning aid
system into block grants. He understood that
categorical grants were complex and promoted
special interest lobbying. Nixon argued that
federal aid had become a “terrible tangle” of
overlap and inefficiency.31 In his 1971 State of
the Union address, Nixon lambasted “the idea
that a bureaucratic elite in Washington knows
best what is best for the people,” and he said
that “the time has now come in America to
reverse the flow of power and resources from
the states and communities to Washington.”32
Nixon’s reforms fell far short of his
rhetoric, and just a few of his “new federalism”
initiatives were enacted. Nixon succeeded in
creating three block grants.33 In addition, an
extreme form of block grant, “revenue shar-
ing,” was begun in 1972 to give funding to the
states with almost no strings attached. The
problem was that revenue sharing did not sub-
stitute for existing grants—it was added on
top. Liberals generally supported Nixon’s rev-
enue sharing because it shifted funding of the
welfare state from flatter state tax systems to
the more graduated federal system. Revenue
sharing was abolished in 1986.
Consolidation of narrow grants into broad-
er block grants made sense to budget experts,
but members of Congress usually favored cate-
gorical grants because they could be better tar-
geted toward special interests. The expansion
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of categorical grants was in sync with the
increasingly fragmented committee structure
in Congress in the mid-20th century. That is,
the number of aid programs grew as the num-
ber of committees and subcommittees grew.
Each committee and subcommittee wanted its
own realm of programs to preside over.
During the 1970s, there were growing con-
cerns about the complexity of the mushroom-
ing federal aid system. A 1973 report by the Tax
Foundation noted that the proliferation and
complexity of grants had “been accompanied
by increasingly heavy criticism, even by sup-
porters of expanded federal assistance.”34 On
the campaign trail in 1976, Jimmy Carter
denounced the “awful federal bureaucracy.”35
When he came into office he proposed a “con-
centrated attack on red tape and confusion in
the federal grant-in-aid system.”36 Carter pur-
sued a number of modest reforms, but like
Nixon he did a better job describing the aid
problem than enacting solutions. 
The bipartisan and highly respected Advi-
sory Commission on Intergovernmental Re-
lations criticized many aspects of the federal
aid system through the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s. In a report in 1978, the ACIR concluded
that “the reach of federal aid is sweeping.
Virtually every state and local activity can be
assisted by some federal program.”37 In 1980
ACIR published an 11-volume study on feder-
alism, which concluded that Washington’s
power had become “more pervasive, more
intrusive, more unmanageable, more ineffec-
tive, more costly, and, above all, more unac-
countable.”38 In an ironic twist, the ACIR,
which was a rare government agency that criti-
cized government programs, was one of the
few agencies abolished by the Republicans in
the 1990s. 
The Government Accountability Office
also criticized the federal aid system. In 1979
it found that the “problems created by our
complex intergovernmental system are enor-
mous.”39 The GAO noted:
The federal assistance system is an
array of often conflicting activities and
initiatives which defy understanding
to all but the most serious students of
the system. . . . During the 1960s, the
explosion in the number of federal pro-
grams made shortcomings in the [aid]
system apparent. Studies showed that
red tape, delays, and vast amounts of
paperwork were characteristics com-
mon to most federal [aid] programs.40
President Ronald Reagan came into office
promising to respond to such concerns and to
revive federalism. He tried to cut aid spending,
convert existing aid programs to block grants,
and transfer some activities back to the states.
He was modestly successful with his first two
goals. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1981 eliminated 59 grant programs and con-
solidated 80 categorical grants into 9 block
grants.41 That consolidation substantially re-
duced the regulatory burden of those pro-
grams, at least initially. For example, 33 educa-
tion programs were collapsed into one block
grant, which reduced the length of related regu-
lations from 667 pages to just 20 pages.42
However, Reagan was not successful in his
third goal. In 1982, under his “new federal-
ism” agenda, he sought to re-sort federal and
state priorities such that each level of govern-
ment would have full responsibility for cer-
tain activities. For example, Reagan proposed
that welfare and food stamps be both
financed and operated by the states.43 Reagan
also proposed “turnback” legislation to end
about 40 federal programs. Thus he pro-
posed that the federal government end most
highway programs and cancel the federal
gasoline taxes that supported them. 
In his 1983 budget message, Reagan argued
that “during the past 20 years, what had been a
classic division of functions between the federal
government and the states and localities has
become a confused mess.”44 Reagan pushed
throughout his time in office to straighten out
the mess. He managed to end revenue sharing
in 1986, which might have grown into a mas-
sive spigot of subsidies for the states if it had
remained in place. 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 show that Reagan had
some success in cutting federal aid. Both aid
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spending and the number of aid programs
were cut substantially during the early 1980s.
Data from the Office of Management and
Budget show that the number of aid pro-
grams for the states was cut from 434 in 1980
to 303 in 1982 before beginning to rise
again.45 ACIR data show similar program
reductions under Reagan.
A few caveats regarding the data should be
noted. OMB data on the number of aid pro-
grams are not available before 1980, while
ACIR data are not available after 1995. But
during the years of overlap (1980–95), the
ACIR typically counted about 60 more pro-
grams than did the OMB. For this reason,
Figure 2 understates the growth in the num-
ber of programs since the 1970s. On the
other hand, the OMB revised its methodolo-
gy for counting programs in 2004, with the
effect of increasing the program count and
overstating the change shown in Figure 2
between 2000 and 2006.
Reagan’s progress in cutting aid programs
was reversed by President George H. W. Bush.
Aid spending and the number of programs
grew rapidly in the early 1990s. Then in the
mid-1990s, the new Republican congressional
majority tried again to revive federalism. Their
biggest success was welfare reform in 1996,
which turned open-ended categorical welfare
aid into a block grant. That had the benefit of
making federal costs more controllable.
The Republicans saved a modest $2 billion
annually by eliminating 73 small aid programs,
although that effort was offset by the estab-
lishment of new programs. They did pass the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,
which modestly restrained the federal govern-
ment’s ability to impose costly regulations on
the states. But the Republicans were unsuc-
cessful in larger federalism reform efforts, such
as abolishing the Department of Education
and turning Medicaid into a block grant.
Since the mid-1990s, there have been no
serious efforts to reform or cut the federal aid
system, even though it is larger and more
costly than ever. The system’s many failings,
which were discussed often during the 1970s
and 1980s, have only become more acute as
hundreds of new programs have been added
since then.  
The current Bush administration has
expanded the aid system rather than tried to
restrain it. Department of Education outlays
have doubled since 2000 as President Bush
has taken steps to further nationalize local
public schools. In other areas, the Bush
administration’s faith-based and marriage
initiatives have hooked thousands of private
organizations on federal subsidies. Richard
Nathan, an architect of Nixon’s new federal-
ism, opined that Bush’s policies “have reflect-
ed a willingness to run roughshod over state
governments that is out of character with
previous Republican administrations.”46
The Federal Aid Empire Today
The number of aid programs increased
from 653 in 2000 to 814 in 2006.47 Aid spend-
ing rose from $351 billion in fiscal 2000 to an
estimated $449 billion in fiscal 2007, measured
in constant 2007 dollars.48 Federal aid to the
states is the third-largest item in the federal
budget after Social Security ($582 billion in fis-
cal 2007) and national defense ($569 billion).
Figure 4 shows that spending on both
health and nonhealth aid soared during the
1990s and then flattened out after 2003. One
reason that spending on aid for health appears
to have slowed is that billions of dollars of
costs for prescription drugs have been moved
from Medicaid, which is a state aid program,
to Medicare, which is not a state aid program.
As aid has grown, state and local govern-
ment budgets have become dependent on it.
In the 1950s federal aid averaged 12 percent of
state and local budgets.49 That share soared
during the 1960s and 1970s, reaching a peak
of 27 percent in 1978. With the retrenchment
during the Reagan years, the share fell to less
than 17 percent in the late 1980s. But since
then the aid share of state and local budgets
has rebounded, rising to 22 percent by 2005.
As discussed below, those large flows of aid
have turned state and local governments into
some of Washington’s biggest lobbyists.  
The five largest federal aid programs are
Medicaid ($192 billion in fiscal 2007), highway
11
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Table 1
A Sampling of Federal Aid Programs for the States
(CFDA program number, short title, and spending in 2006)
Agriculture
10.555 National School Lunch $7,457,572,000
10.574 Team Nutrition Grants 10,038,000
10.576 Seniors Farmers Markets 15,000,000
10.760 Waste Disposal for Rural Communities 456,390,000
10.855 Distance Learning and Telemedicine 54,410,012
Education
84.011 Migrant Education State Grants 376,524,000
84.027 Special Education 10,582,961,000
84.083 Women's Educational Equity Act 2,926,000
84.186 Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities 346,500,000
84.367 Improving Teacher Quality 2,887,439,000
Health and Human Services
93.086 Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood 150,000,000
93.235 Abstinence Education 50,000,000
93.276 Drug-Free Communities 16,621,505
93.568 Low-Income Home Energy Assistance 2,979,703,000
93.959 Prevention and Treatment of Substance Abuse 1,670,661,450
Housing and Urban Development
14.169 Housing Counseling Assistance 42,000,000
14.228 Community Development Block Grants 12,605,900,261
14.250 Rural Housing and Economic Development 16,830,000
14.850 Public and Indian Housing 3,565,223,000
14.901 Healthy Homes Demonstration Grants 4,400,000
Interior
15.022 Tribal Self-Governance 297,000,000
15.030 Indian Law Enforcement 114,620,400
15.052 Litigation Support for Indian Rights 1,431,000
15.605 Sport Fishing Restoration 290,359,836
15.626 Hunter Education and Safety 8,000,000
Justice
16.525 Violent Crimes Against Women on Campus $8,938,000
16.580 Byrne State and Local Law Enforcement Aid 189,255,557
16.595 Weed and Seed 49,361,400
16.710 Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing 472,191,152
16.727 Enforcing Underage Drinking Laws 23,220,238
Labor
17.235 Senior Community Service Employment 94,000,000
17.259 WIA Youth Activities 926,393,000
17.260 WIA Dislocated Workers 1,181,000,000
17.264 Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers 80,000,000
17.269 Community Based Job Training 125,000,000
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construction ($39 billion), Temporary Assist-
ance for Needy Families ($17 billion), education
for the disadvantaged ($14 billion), and Section
8 housing subsidies ($15 billion).50
Table 1 provides a sampling of aid programs
in order to illustrate the diversity of activities
that the federal government subsidizes.
Couldn’t state and local governments or the pri-
vate sector fund those activities? Do we really
need the federal government involved in school
lunches, farmers’ markets, hunter education,
seniors’ community service, airport improve-
ment, and boating safety? If First Lady Laura
Bush wants to give $24 million to libraries,
shouldn’t she collect the funding privately,
instead of imposing on taxpayers to pay for the
Laura Bush 21st Century Library Program?
Another curious program is Sport Fishing
Restoration.51 In fiscal 2006 the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service program handed out to state
governments $290 million in grant money
raised from various excise taxes and import
duties.52 In 2000 the GAO criticized the pro-
gram’s mismanagement and “culture of per-
missive spending,” but the agency seems to
have since cleaned up its act.53 In 2006 federal
administration costs for the program were
$22 million, and it’s not hard to see where the
money goes when you examine the program’s
activities.54 For example, program officials at
different levels seem to get together for fre-
quent meetings in locations such as Las Vegas,
Charleston, and Lake Placid.55
While “fishing restoration” sounds like an
environmental activity, many of the grants in
this program go toward building boat launch-
es, parking lots, piers, and other items that
don’t do much for nature. Federal rules require
that at least 15 percent of this program’s funds
be spent on improving boating access to lakes
and rivers.56 One $1.2 million “fishing restora-
tion” grant was for a MegaDock for luxury
yachts at Charleston City Marina. An article in
Boating News described how the “new extension
will serve to attract larger yachts. The largest
yacht to tie up to date was 300 feet.”57 That’s
good news for wealthy boat owners. The bad
news is that “reportedly, over half of the funds
are used for administration, not leaving very
much for the proposed projects.”58
Types of Aid
The 814 federal aid programs for the
states generally take the form of either “for-
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Transportation
20.106 Airport Improvement 3,423,404,000
20.205 Highway Planning and Construction 24,244,734,429
20.601 Alcohol Traffic Safety and Drunk Driving 125,000,000
20.609 Safety Belt Performance Grants 124,500,000
20.930 Payments for Small Community Air Service 10,000,000
Environmental Protection
66.032 State Indoor Radon Grants 7,438,900
66.036 Clean School Bus USA 6,270,000
66.308 Environmental Justice Research Assistance 1,000,000
66.458 Capitalization Grants for Clean Water 886,759,100
66.818 Brownfields Assessment and Cleanup 69,900,000
Other Aid Programs
23.003 Appalachian Development Highway System 470,000,000
45.313 Laura Bush 21st Century Library Program 23,760,000
81.042 Weatherization Assistance 227,000,000
97.012 Boating Safety Financial Assistance 95,000,000
97.044 Assistance to Firefighters 524,442,600
Source: Author’s compilation from the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. These spending totals may dif-
fer from outlay amounts in the federal budget.
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mula” or “project” grants.59 While most aid
programs are project grants, most aid spend-
ing is on formula grants. That is because
many of the largest aid programs, including
Medicaid, are formula grants.
Under formula grants, legislation spells
out how much funding each state is to receive
on the basis of factors such as state income
and population. The states are often required
to match some portion of the federal govern-
ment’s aid with their own funding. Generally,
the smaller a state’s required funding share,
the more it will be induced to increase spend-
ing on an activity in order to maximize the
flow of federal dollars. After they receive feder-
al aid, the states consume it themselves or pass
it down to local governments on the basis of
various allocation procedures.
Under project (or “discretionary”) grants,
federal agencies distribute thousands of indi-
vidual grants on a competitive basis after an
expert review of proposals. (At least that is
how it is supposed to work). Project grants
generally require grantees to submit detailed
work plans, regular reports, and other paper-
work regarding their use of federal dollars.
One form of “discretionary” aid is ear-
marking. That occurs when the grant process
is hijacked by individual members of Congress
seeking to divert funds to particular projects
in their districts. Thus, while a federal agency
might normally distribute cancer research
grants on the basis of an expert review of pro-
posals, politicians can end-run around the
agency and directly target funds to health
facilities in their districts. Note that the feder-
al contracting process also gets hijacked by
congressional earmarking. 
Earmarking has exploded in recent years,
and numerous congressional scandals have
stemmed from the practice. The number of
earmarks in federal spending bills increased
from fewer than 2,000 per year in the mid-
1990s to more than 15,000 per year recently.60
This report focuses on aid to state govern-
ments, but the federal government also has
hundreds of programs that directly provide
subsidies to businesses, nonprofit groups, and
individuals. A complete list of federal aid pro-
grams is the 2,437-page Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance.61 It provides an official list-
ing of all federal programs that dispense
grants, loans, insurance, scholarships, and
other types of cash and noncash benefits.62
Aid programs for the states are a subset of
all federal subsidy programs. In 2006 the
CFDA listed 1,696 federal subsidy programs,
of which 814 were for state and local govern-
ments, as noted. The number of aid programs
for the states has followed the same general
trends over time as the total number of pro-
grams in the CFDA. The number of programs
was fairly flat during the 1970s, was cut in the
early 1980s, and then rose rapidly during the
early 1990s. Since 2000 the number of subsidy
programs listed in the CFDA has soared, rising
from 1,425 in 2000 to 1,696 by 2006.63
Politics Creates Complexity
Despite general agreement among experts
that block grants are superior to narrow cate-
gorical grants, only about 20 of the more than
800 state aid programs are block grants.64 The
reason is that “beneficiaries of categorical pro-
grams [have] actively opposed grant consoli-
dation as a threat to their established interests,
reinforced by protective credit-claiming pro-
gram sponsors in Congress,” noted aid expert
Tim Conlan referring to Nixon’s block grant
efforts.65 The GAO similarly concluded: 
The categorical approach to federal
assistance has come under increasing
criticism in recent years. It has been char-
acterized as unwieldy and, on a cost-ben-
efit basis, unproductive . . . [however,]
our political system tends to favor cate-
gorical grant programs because they are
easier to track and legislation addressing
a specific need holds far more political
appeal than broader purpose block
grant programs. Any effort to incorpo-
rate categorical programs into a broader
purpose program is interpreted as an
attack on the congressional committees
who created the programs, the agencies
who administer them, and the clientele
groups who prosper.66
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Thus, the federal aid system is not about
financing and operating programs in the most
efficient manner; it is about politics. Categorical
grants are more politically appealing because
members of Congress can use them to champi-
on narrow causes and win interest group sup-
port. Politicians, special interests, and aid recipi-
ents resist conversion of programs to block
grants because that would reduce their control
and make programs easier to cut. One can
debate whether or not federal aid is a good idea
in theory, but in practice the political system has
locked the nation into the most complex and
inefficient form of aid: categorical aid. 
That said, both block and categorical
grants involve top-down control of state and
local activities from Washington. Both types
of grant lead to the creation of large bureauc-
racies. Still, converting categorical grants to
block grants would represent progress because
it would make federal costs more controllable
and aid spending easier to cut. A good first
step toward restraining Medicaid’s explosive
spending growth, for example, would be to
convert it to a block grant.
On the other hand, if reform efforts focus
only on converting existing grants to block
grants, it might only result in short-lived vic-
tories. Scholars have observed that in the
years after block grants were established in
the 1970s and 1980s, their relative simplicity
subsequently unraveled as complex regula-
tions began to creep back into programs. At
the same time, new categorical grants were
created to fill the demands of narrow interest
groups that felt shortchanged under new
block grants. The GAO reported that the
Reagan block grants were changed 58 times
in subsequent years as Congress reinstated
more rules and regulations.67
The unraveling of block grant reforms over
time is akin to the unraveling of major tax
code reforms. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
eliminated some narrow loopholes in the tax
code while reducing overall tax rates and was
hailed by proponents as a step toward a sim-
pler tax code. Others note that the act added
much new complexity to the code. But all
would agree that, after 1986, many narrow
incentives and credits were added to the tax
code, and it is more complex today than ever.
Thus, it seems that democratic political pres-
sures create increasing complexity on both the
tax and spending sides of the federal budget
over time.
To sum up, today’s federal aid structure is
massive and complex. Experts have com-
plained about high administrative costs, com-
plexity, and program overlaps for decades. The
three layers of government in the United
States now resemble, not the tidy layer cake
that existed in the 19th century, but a jumbled
marble cake. Federal expansion into policy
areas traditionally reserved to the states has
proven to be a wasteful and bureaucratic way
of governing the nation. 
Even those who believe in aid on a theoret-
ical basis have been humbled by the inability
of governments over many decades to make
the system work efficiently. There are too
many politicians, too many different interests,
and too many layers of bureaucracy for pro-
grams to be designed rationally. The GAO has
noted that the “sheer number of actors creates
immense coordination problems” and that
“the high costs appear inevitable” under such
a large aid system.68
Another problem is that aid programs gen-
erally work poorly, partly because Congress
provides nowhere near enough oversight. The
ACIR noted that “once a grant is designed and
operating, Congress has a key oversight role
[but it] is far more interested in, and believes it
gets much more payoff from, working on new
legislation than monitoring the results of law
already on the books.”69 The Bush administra-
tion has performed detailed reviews of 257 fed-
eral aid programs and found that 109 of them
are “ineffective” or could not “demonstrate
results.”70 Yet Congress has shown little inter-
est in cutting or terminating those programs.
A serious side effect of the aid system that
needs more attention is the “overload” that it
has created on federal policymakers. As the sys-
tem has expanded, it has stretched thinner
their ability to focus on crucial issues of nation-
al importance such as terrorism. Members of
Congress spend much of their time trying to
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secure spending for favored state and local
activities and tweaking the regulations
attached to aid programs. The president of the
United States is the commander in chief of the
U.S. military, but even he could be mistaken for
the head of a local school board at times.
A number of investigations have revealed
that most members of the House and Senate
intelligence committees don’t bother, or
don’t have time, to read crucial intelligence
reports.71 A reporter recently asked long-time
members of the congressional intelligence
committees basic questions about the war in
Iraq and Islamic terrorism, and their answers
revealed severe ignorance.72 It is hard to
quantify the extent to which the burgeoning
aid system has led policymakers to ignore
national problems, such as the rise in the ter-
rorism threat prior to 9/11, but it is a critical
concern that can be addressed by downsizing
the federal aid system.
Federal Aid and
Activist Politicians
Over the decades, policymakers have
argued that various state, local, and private
activities needed federal intervention because
they had become “national priorities.” A leader
on aid issues in the 1960s, Sen. Edmund
Muskie (D-ME) stated, “The national govern-
ment is best placed to have a broad view of
national interest, to identify national priorities
and to see to it that they are met . . . [thus it]
distributes and administers funds in the form
of categorical grant programs.”73
More recently, a fact sheet from current
Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings
begins: “The responsibility for K-12 education
rests with the states under the Constitution.
There is also a compelling national interest in
the quality of the nation’s public schools.
Therefore, the federal government . . . provides
assistance to the states and schools in an effort
to supplement, not supplant, state support.”74
The flaw in logic here is that there are few
activities that the federal government performs
that are not also priorities of individuals, busi-
nesses, and state and local governments. One
can call education a “national” priority, but
that does not mean that the federal govern-
ment has to get involved. That’s because edu-
cation is also a high priority of local govern-
ments and families. Local governments are free
to learn schooling techniques from each other,
but there is no compelling reason for top-
down control from Washington.
President Ronald Reagan made the fol-
lowing observation in a 1987 executive order
on federalism:
It is important to recognize the distinc-
tion between problems of national scope
(which may justify federal action) and
problems that are merely common to
the states (which will not justify federal
action because individual states, acting
individually or together, can effectively
deal with them).75 
A portion of Reagan’s executive order is
included in the Appendix. The confusion
between problems that are truly national in
scope and those that are merely common to
the states even extends to homeland security.
When you look at the details of federal aid to
the states for homeland security, you find
that much is going toward items that would
be better funded locally, such as bulletproof
vests and radio systems for first responders.
When this sort of local spending is federal-
ized, members of Congress play a game of
tug of war over funding for their states and
ignore the value taxpayers receive for their
money. If, instead, funding and spending
decisions are made together at the state or
local level, cost and benefit tradeoffs will bet-
ter reflect the preferences of citizens within
each jurisdiction.
National and Local Interests
The idea that aid to the states can be
designed in the “national interest” is a theory
that doesn’t match political reality. The con-
cern of members of Congress for their states
and districts almost always trumps any other
policy considerations. Members may con-
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vince themselves that spending on aid proj-
ects in their hometowns is good for the coun-
try, but that is only because the resulting tax
burdens are spread over the rest of the nation
and invisible to them. For a senator from
Alaska, spending on a bridge in that state is
always more important than is the project’s
impact on federal taxes or the deficit. Even
presidents, who are elected with national
mandates, often favor spending that targets
narrow interests because the spending bene-
ficiaries are more visible than the taxpayers
who will bear the costs. 
Proponents of aid have held that it is in the
national interest to design programs that sup-
port activities in regions of the country that
have the greatest needs. But in practice, the aid
system has never operated in that fashion. A
1940 article in Congressional Quarterly lament-
ed that “the grants-in-aid system in the United
States has developed in a haphazard fashion.
Particular services have been singled out for
subsidy at the behest of pressure groups, and
little attention has been given to national and
state interests as a whole.”76 Forty years later,
the ACIR concluded essentially the same
thing:
Regarding national purpose, the record
indicates that federal grant-in-aid pro-
grams have never reflected any consistent
or coherent interpretation of national
needs. . . . Regarding fiscal equity, the record
indicates that federal aid programs have
never consistently transferred income to
the poorest jurisdictions or individuals.77
The “Robin Hood” principle, the ACIR
observed, “has always received much more lip
service than actual use in aid distribution.”78
The GAO looked at that issue in 1996, exam-
ining whether aid was directed to the states
that had “greater programmatic needs and
fewer fiscal resources.”79 It found that “feder-
al aid is not targeted to offset these fiscal
imbalances.”80
More recently, a study by Robert Helms of
the American Enterprise Institute found that
those states with higher poverty rates received
less federal Medicaid funding on a per capita
basis than other states.81 Also, a recent study
by Education Trust came to similar conclu-
sions about federal aid for public schools. The
Washington Post summarized the findings:
A $13 billion federal program to help
students from low-income families has
actually widened an education funding
gap between rich and poor states. . . .
The program, known as Title 1, is part
of a slew of federal, state, and local
policies that direct more resources to
the nation’s wealthiest children than
to its poorest, the study concluded.82
Whether or not one agrees with the idea
that the federal government ought to transfer
resources from rich states to poor states, the
evidence shows that the federal aid system
does not accomplish that goal. This is impor-
tant because the belief that the federal govern-
ment can and should help poor regions of the
country has underpinned support for the fed-
eral aid system from the beginning.
In the operation of the aid system, political
and parochial concerns are far more important
than theoretical concerns about national pri-
orities or helping those in need. The aid system
is a $449 billion playground on which mem-
bers of Congress target subsidies to their states.
The problem is not that members aren’t patri-
ots; it is that they are also activists and—like
most people—they have emotional and com-
munity ties to their hometowns. Indeed, mem-
bers usually have strong ties to businesses and
nonprofit groups in their states because many
were former state and local legislators.
Of course, even before the modern grants-
in-aid system, federal politicians championed
spending activities that benefited their home
states. Legislators with navy bases in their
states have always supported navy spending,
for example. But the expansion of the aid sys-
tem in recent decades has enormously magni-
fied the age-old regional battles in Congress.
Interestingly, the rise in aid in the 1960s
coincided with the rise of computers, which
became a tool that politicians used to fine-
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tune their parochial spending advocacy. By
the early 1970s, budget experts were dis-
cussing how Congress had descended into
“politics by printout.”83 At the time, pro-
posed legislation for aid programs would be
run through mainframe computers at the
Department of the Treasury, and printouts
would be delivered to Capitol Hill so that
members could see whether their districts
gained or lost from any changes.84
The recent explosion in the earmarking of
federal aid and procurement has taken geo-
graphic political competition one step fur-
ther.85 As noted, the number of earmarks in
federal legislation rose from fewer than 2,000
annually in the mid-1990s to more than
15,000 by 2005.86 Some earmarking misallo-
cates resources for properly federal activities
such as defense. Last year’s defense bill includ-
ed 3,000 earmarks.87 But most earmarking is
for federal spending on what are properly
state, local, and private activities. 
By opening the floodgates to earmarking,
Congress has encouraged a stampede of local
interests to beat a path to Capitol Hill. Local
governments and local organizations are
increasingly making end-runs around state
officials and going straight to Congress when-
ever they need a new parking lot, museum, or
airport terminal.88 A recent Wall Street Journal
story described how lobbying by local groups
in Washington is undermining the ability of
state officials to make coherent plans for state
infrastructure such as highways. A major high-
way bill enacted in 2005 included 6,371 ear-
marks.
Earmarking is also tied to recent corrup-
tion scandals. Disgraced lobbyist Jack
Abramoff famously called the appropriations
committees in Congress “favor factories.”
Indeed, they are. Politicians trade earmarks for
campaign assistance, trips, sweetheart busi-
ness deals, and general political support. Total
fees paid to registered lobbyists in Washington
increased from $100 million in 1975 to $2.5
billion in 2006, with a substantial share of
those fees related to earmark lobbying.89
Recent scandals have shown that federal
politicians can’t keep their hands out of the
cookie jar, but the fundamental problem is
that the federal cookie jar has grown so large.
With 814 state aid programs and 1,696 federal
subsidy programs overall, it is not surprising
that the number of earmarks has soared
because each program is a delivery vehicle for
favors to home-state interests. The earmarking
explosion was a scandal waiting to happen.
Parochial politics feeds on itself and has cre-
ated a dynamic response from the states. The
more aid programs and more earmarking
there are, the more active state and local offi-
cials and interest groups in Washington
become. Highway contractors, school teachers,
and policemen have learned that the payoff
from the one-stop subsidy shop in Washing-
ton is higher than the payoff from lobbying
each state separately. A century ago, the agri-
cultural, education, and highway industries
were the first to discover the efficiency of lob-
bying for subsidies in Washington, and thou-
sands of other local interests have since joined
them in the nation’s capital. 
The same dynamics are in play regarding
federal regulations. A special interest group
that wants to get a law imposed in all 50 states
can go straight to Congress and attach a regu-
lation to an aid program, rather than fight
separate battles in each state. A classic example
was the national drinking age law champi-
oned by Mothers Against Drunk Driving. The
group had existed for just four years in 1984
when it managed to get Congress to impose a
drinking age of 21 on the states by tying the
regulation to a federal highway aid bill. 
Earmarks represent just a part of the region-
al skirmishing in Congress over federal aid. The
formulas used for distributing aid are a bigger
battleground. Consider the ongoing fights over
the formulas used to distribute homeland secu-
rity aid. Members from states with low risks of
terrorism, such as Sens. Ted Stevens (R-AK) and
Susan Collins (R-ME), have pushed hard to dis-
tribute grants on the basis of metrics that favor
their rural and less populated states but are not
related to risk.90 As a result of such efforts,
homeland security aid has often gone to
regions that don’t need it in order to buy expen-
sive items that are little used.91
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Members of Congress also battle over the
formulas used for health care grants. A recent
Washington Post story profiled Sen. Hillary
Clinton’s (D-NY) fight to tweak the formula
that distributes federal grants for HIV/AIDs
so that a little more flows to New York.92 By
engaging in such a fight, Clinton is signaling
to her constituents that she is a champion of
their interests. The efficiency of programs
and their positive or negative effects are not
politically important. It is the spending that
generates the favorable media coverage.
Parochial Obsessions
Evidence that federal legislators are
obsessed with parochial interests, not broad
national interests, can be found on their offi-
cial websites. The purpose of many, perhaps
most, congressional press releases is to tout
the securing of federal benefits for home-
state activities. The following are a few recent
releases:
• House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA):
“Pelosi Announces Grant for Hybrid
Fuel Cell Bus,” regarding a $5 million
grant for a San Francisco bus system.93
• House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-
MD): “Hoyer Announces Federal Funding
for Hollywood Volunteer Fire Depart-
ment,” regarding a $100,000 grant to a
Maryland fire department.94
• House Minority Leader John Boehner (R-
OH): “Boehner Congratulates Edison
Community College on Job Training
Grant,” regarding a $2 million grant.95
• House Minority Whip Roy Blunt (R-
MO): “Congressman Blunt Announces
Humanities Grant for Drury University
Professor,” regarding a $40,000 grant
for a professor to study “American
Romanticism and the Civil War.”96
• Senate Majority Whip Richard Durbin
(D-Ill): “Durbin, Manzullo Announce
SBA Disaster Assistance for Rockford
Flood Victims,” regarding Small Business
Administration loans to homeowners
affected by a minor flood in Illinois.97
• Senate Minority Whip Trent Lott (R-
MS): “Senator Lott Announces $3 mil-
lion for Mississippi Fire Departments,”
regarding Department of Homeland
Security grants for 23 fire departments
in the senator’s state.98
Note that many such press releases do not
involve earmarks; instead they tout routine
federal grant awards for which the members
are simply trying to take credit. Either way, it
seems perverse that the nation’s top leaders
in Congress focus on such obscure local con-
cerns when there are so many serious nation-
al problems to deal with, such as the entitle-
ment spending crisis.
Sadly, the scramble of the 535 legislators
on Capitol Hill to grab a slice of the federal
subsidy pie is an all-consuming activity.
Members and staffers insert spending projects
into appropriations bills and tweak grant for-
mulas to steer aid to their regions. Every mem-
ber’s Washington and home-state offices have
specialists in “grants work” and “constituent
services” to help residents gain federal bene-
fits. House and Senate offices hire about as
many employees to handle constituent ser-
vices and grants work as they do to handle leg-
islative activities.99
Member websites have areas devoted to
helping constituents find federal funding.100
The website of Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA)
offers to come to the rescue of those seeking
funding, noting that “working with the fed-
eral government to many people can be a vir-
tual maze of red tape and impossible bureau-
cratic regulations.”101 Congressional offices
help write grant proposals for constituents,
they sponsor seminars on securing funding,
and they write letters to federal agencies in
support of constituent requests.
The Congressional Research Service instructs
congressional offices to be proactive in finding
out who in the state or district has applied for
federal aid.102 Offices should contact these appli-
cants and provide support so that when the fed-
eral money comes through, the member of
Congress can claim credit. Apparently, federal
agencies usually contact congressional offices
before announcing grant awards in order to
19
Evidence that 
federal legislators
are obsessed 
with parochial
interests, not
broad national
interests, can be
found on their
official websites.
339907 Pa593_1stclass.qxp  5/9/2007  12:22 PM  Page 19
allow members “an opportunity to notify recipi-
ents of grants.”103 The purpose of all this, of
course, is to create the mirage that grants are gifts
from politicians, not taxpayers. 
Congressional offices create for con-
stituents newsletters about federal funding
opportunities. The House of Representatives
publishes a weekly “Federal Funding Report”
regarding aid opportunities and runs a web-
site called “Federal Funds Express.”104 In sum,
members of Congress run full-service shops to
keep the subsidies flowing to their districts.
Most members claim to be friends of the tax-
payer, but in reality their main goal is to feed
the “tax eaters,” the consumers of federal aid.
Federal aid is used as a political tool, not
just by Congress, but by the executive branch
as well. Leading up to the 2004 elections, the
Bush administration sent cabinet secretaries
around the country to key states and congres-
sional districts to hand out grant funding.105
The energy secretary flew to swing states such
as Florida and Pennsylvania handing out $100
million for coal mining here and $235 million
for a power plant there. Other administration
executives handed out grants for job training,
education, and community development. 
Leading up to the 2006 elections, Bush cab-
inet secretaries were at it again—flying from
state to state distributing grant money to the
districts of Republicans in tight races. In
October, Secretary of Education Margaret
Spellings flew to Pennsylvania to deliver a $6.3
million grant and then to Ohio to deliver a $20
million grant.106 Secretary of Labor Elaine
Chao went to Pennsylvania to hand out a $10.4
million grant, and Secretary of Agriculture
Michael Johanns dispensed grants as well.
Busybodies and Philanthropists
Those sorts of activities come naturally to
most politicians, who are by nature activists
and busybodies. They are in constant need of
spending activities in order to provide bullet
points for their speeches, fodder for their press
releases, and a focus for their campaigns. The
large array of aid programs provides a rich
menu of items for politicians to champion in
order to signal that they are helping people. 
By promoting a range of aid programs,
members of Congress can pretend to be
doing something about lagging education,
highway congestion, and many other prob-
lems. Capitol Hill is full of “entrepreneurs”
who gain loyal constituencies by targeting
them with streams of aid. An ACIR analysis
looked at the factors that caused the growth
in federal aid.107 They found that “entrepre-
neurship” by individual politicians was the
main cause of the creation of new programs.
Once programs are in place, both politicians
and lobbyists are quick to defend them and
push for expansions. 
Aid to the states has a number of political
advantages over direct federal spending on
an activity. One is that if it becomes clear that
an aid program doesn’t work, federal politi-
cians can blame poor state and local admin-
istration. Another is that federal politicians
can induce more spending on an activity by
requiring states to match federal funding
amounts. That allows them to claim credit
for the overall program but be responsible for
only part of the resulting tax burden.
Spending on aid programs rewards the
egos of politicians. They get lauded for their
noble public service, get toasted at gala din-
ners, and get buildings and highways named
in their honor. They enjoy being “philan-
thropists.” Most legislators become advocates
of programs rather than neutral referees who
judge the merits of programs against the costs
to taxpayers. If you look at congressional web-
sites, you find that many members boast of
the awards they have won for their support of
subsidy programs.
Sen. Patty Murray’s (D-WA) website proudly
lists 81 different awards for her pro-spending
efforts.108 Awards include “Friend of the Farm
Bureau,” the “Golden Spike Award” from Am-
trak, and the “Lifetime Leadership for Quality
Childcare Award.” She boasts of awards for “tire-
less support of Asian Pacific elders,” “leadership
in building communities that thrive,” “improv-
ing the quality of child care,” and “support of
children and families in the nation.”
Despite what many politicians think, how-
ever, championing special interest spending is
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not a guarantee of electoral success. Former
senator Mike DeWine was a big spending
Republican from Ohio, who called himself
“bodyguard of the poor” while championing
many federal aid programs. His Senate website
boasted a remarkable list of 44 “humanitari-
an” and “public service” awards from various
special interest groups.109 DeWine was sound-
ly defeated for reelection in 2006. 
Like former senator DeWine, most politi-
cians are natural activists, and they believe it is
always safe to play the spending game and
appease as many special interests as possible.
That political strategy makes it easy to raise
campaign money and generate flattering media
coverage, but it doesn’t necessarily sell with vot-
ers. An alternative strategy is to be a maverick
spending cutter, as is Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK).
Coburn has shown that this approach can be
very successful, but it is much harder work, and
most legislators don’t have a taste for making
enemies of powerful interest groups.
Most members of Congress use the DeWine
strategy, not the Coburn strategy. One reason is
that pro-spending positions usually get favor-
able and uncritical coverage in the media. In
2006 the Bush administration tried to trim fed-
eral grants to local police forces. That prompt-
ed members of both parties on Capitol Hill to
jump to the defense of the grants and squash
the proposal. A Washington Post story was head-
lined “Lawmakers Criticize Budget Cuts for
Police.”110 The story said that the Bush propos-
al would “slash assistance” and create “deep
cuts” to “popular” programs for local police
forces. The story noted that “the International
Association of Chiefs of Police and other police
groups lobbied Congress to restore the cuts.”
Sometimes such stories are not overtly
biased, but they rarely ask fundamental ques-
tions. Nowhere in this story was the propri-
ety of those public servants lobbying for self-
serving subsidies questioned. And nowhere
was there any questioning of why the federal
government ought to be funding local police
at all. Subtle cues in the story suggested that
spending cuts are bad—programs that are
slated for trimming are frequently called
“popular” by the Washington Post.
Politicians don’t just jump to the defense
of aid programs; they often try to cow anyone
who proposes restraint. When new allotments
of aid for homeland security were awarded in
2006, some states did better than others com-
pared to prior years. The states that did worse
raised a stink and tried to reverse the alloca-
tions. Rep. Peter King (R-NY), an important
appropriator, said: 
As far as I’m concerned, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security and the
administration have declared war on
New York. . . . It’s a knife in the back of
New York, and I’m going to do every-
thing I can to make them very sorry they
made their decision.111
When it comes to aid for their states,
politicians don’t take no for an answer. If fed-
eral agencies try to be frugal with taxpayer
funds, or allocate aid with the national inter-
est in mind, politicians do their best to
stomp out such behavior. Threats like King’s
ensure that agency bureaucrats concerned
about their careers go along with the waste-
ful ways of Congress.
The inability to accept no was revealed after
a minor flood in 2006 that damaged 200
homes in wealthy Fairfax County, Virginia.112
The Federal Emergency Management Agency
made the decision to deny federal flood aid to
the county, saying that homeowners did not
suffer enough damage to warrant it. That
prompted Virginia’s senators and local House
members to lobby the secretary of homeland
security, Michael Chertoff, to reverse the deci-
sion. Unfortunately, the huge flow of federal
subsidies to the states has created a situation in
which the attention of top officials like
Chertoff is being constantly diverted to deal
with trivial local matters. 
The States: America’s
Biggest Lobby
State and local policymakers enjoy spend-
ing just as much as federal policymakers do. It
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is an easy political decision for governors to
cheerlead for federal aid spending in their
states because taxpayers in other states are
paying most of the costs. The Republican gov-
ernor of Texas, Rick Perry, is considered a con-
servative, but his official webpage is chock full
of press releases touting his handouts of fed-
eral subsidies. In the space of a few weeks last
summer, the following releases appeared:113
• “Perry: Texas Farmers and Ranchers to
Share $780 Million in Drought Assist-
ance.” 
• “Perry: FEMA Agrees to Reimburse Texas
at Same Rate as Louisiana for Hurri-
canes.” 
• “Gov. Perry Announces $1.6 Million in
Grants to Juvenile Offender Accountabil-
ity Programs.” 
• “Perry: Homeland Security Grants to
Focus on Technology Needs.”
• “Gov. Perry: Presidential Disaster Dec-
laration Approved for El Paso.”
• “Gov. Perry Announces $38,098 in
Victims of Crime Act Funds to El Paso
County.”
• “Gov. Perry Announces $3.6 Million in
Grants to Local Law Enforcement.”
The web pages of some other governors
reveal a similar pattern of trumpeting the
receipt of federal subsidies. Nebraska: “Gov.
Heineman Accepts $37.7 Million from USDA
for Rural Development Projects.”114 Kansas:
“Kansas receives $10 million for substance
abuse prevention.”115 Wisconsin: “Doyle,
Lawton Announce $56,000 Grant to Expand
Kasco Marine in Prescott.”116
As federal aid has increased, governors
have become less like chief executives and
more like regional deputies for the federal
government. In their defense, the governors
would say that they have no choice because
Congress has stripped their powers and con-
trols over just about everything. Indeed, a
White House review of federalism in the
1980s argued that the federal government
had become “virtually omnipotent,” trans-
forming the states from “the hub of political
activity and the very source of our political
tradition [into] . . . administrative units of the
national government.”117
The ACIR echoed that assessment in a
1993 report. Supreme Court decisions had
eviscerated federalism to the extent that it
“essentially reduced the status of the states to
that of ‘interest groups’ operating and com-
peting in the national political process.”118
Since the explosion of federal aid in the
1960s, state and local governments have
become major lobbyists in Washington. The
new lobbying industry was called “grantsman-
ship.” The ACIR reported in 1967 that “grants-
manship has become a popular new game in
Washington.”119 The Wall Street Journal pub-
lished a story in 1966 about the new profession
of “grantsman.”120 Grantsmen were the high-
paid middlemen who benefited from the maze
of President Johnson’s new aid programs. The
Journal described how the areas of the country
that received the most aid were those with the
largest teams of grantsmen in Washington, not
necessarily those that were the most in need.
Many state and local interest groups were
organized, or greatly expanded their Washing-
ton offices, during the 1960s, including the
National Governors Association, the Council of
State Governments, and the U.S. Conference of
Mayors. By 1967, 13 states and 24 cities and
counties had established Washington offices to
lobby for aid.121 Many aid-related trade associa-
tions were formed or expanded during this peri-
od, such as those representing education inter-
ests.  
Today there are 88,000 state and local gov-
ernment entities in the United States, includ-
ing cities, counties, towns, school districts, and
special districts.122 Most receive—and many
actively solicit—federal funding. All those gov-
ernmental units, and their 16 million employ-
ees, represent a powerful lobby in support of
aid programs and the vast federal welfare state.  
As the number of aid programs has grown,
state and local officials have put increasing
efforts into federal lobbying. For example, it is
routine for local groups across the country to
organize “fly-ins” to Washington for personal
arm-twisting on Capitol Hill. One recent news
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article profiled fly-ins by officials from
California counties.123 In early 2007, San
Joaquin County send 70 local officials to
Washington and Stanislaus County sent 17
officials. Such local groups pay Washington
lobbying firms to organize their meetings and
strategies, and each group comes equipped
with a wish list of local projects that they want
funded.  
Who can blame today’s state and local offi-
cials for putting so much effort into lobbying?
Aid is very competitive, and there are winners
and losers in federal fiscal roulette. One analy-
sis looked at the state-by-state distribution of
$10 billion in earmarks for 2005 and found
that spending ranged from $985 per capita in
Alaska to just $3 per capita in Texas.124 An
analysis of overall federal aid to the states for
2004 found large variations between jurisdic-
tions.125 The recipients of the most aid on a
per capita basis were the District of Columbia
($7,445), Alaska ($4,972), and Wyoming
($3,268), while the recipients of the smallest
amounts of aid were Nevada ($1,045), Virginia
($1,085), and Florida ($1,158).
Lobbying Strategies
State governments treat federal aid like a
gold mine, and they use a multipronged
strategy to secure their share of aid nuggets.
First, they work with their state delegations
in Congress to steer as much spending as
possible toward home. Then they create gov-
ernment agencies that track and manage the
securing of federal subsidies. 
Texas has an Office of State-Federal
Relations that decides priorities for the state
regarding federal aid funding, provides news
from Congress on aid programs, and works
with Texas agencies to maximize federal fund-
ing.126 Maryland has a sophisticated grants
agency that was created to tackle the “increas-
ing competition with other states” for federal
aid.127 The agency seeks to increase Maryland’s
“market share” of aid through activities such
as “relationship building” with federal aid
decisionmakers. The agency publishes a 328-
page annual report that examines the state’s
receipt of federal aid in great detail.
In California, a major performance review
of state government under Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger found that the state “does
not receive its fair share of federal grant
funds.”128 The report examined the issue in
detail and proposed that the state “develop
aggressive strategies” for “maximizing” feder-
al aid, including creating a new office to bet-
ter coordinate aid efforts.129
Aside from such in-house grant agencies,
many states have created “think tanks” to
track the federal budget process and research
strategies to increase federal aid. California
has the California Institute for Federal Policy
Research in Washington, D.C., which operates
a sophisticated tracking system for federal leg-
islation.130 That organization has a corporate
board stacked with California politicians,
business leaders, and representatives of special
interest groups. California also has the Public
Policy Institute of California based in San
Francisco. This organization provides fre-
quent and detailed reports on California’s
share of federal aid funding.131
The Northeast-Midwest Institute represents
a group of 18 states stretching from Vermont to
Minnesota. The institute’s website says that it
publishes the “most detailed analysis of the
flow of federal funds to the states, demonstrat-
ing the persistent federal disinvestment in
Northeastern and Midwestern states.”132 Inter-
estingly, this institute both lobbies for federal
aid to its member states and receives federal aid
itself. Audits show that the institute receives
about $800,000 annually from 12 different fed-
eral grant programs.133
The Northeast-Midwest Institute’s website
boasts about its lobbying prowess. It says that
the institute helped “protect Amtrak routes in
the region,” helped “restore funding for sum-
mer youth programs for cities that would have
lost a large part of their allocation under a new
formula,” “altered the food stamp program’s
criteria to take into account higher costs of liv-
ing in cold climates,” “defeated persistent
attempts by southern lawmakers to change the
match rate for Medicaid and welfare payments
to the detriment of the Northeast-Midwest,”
and “established a dual Community Develop-
23
State 
governments
treat federal aid
like a gold mine,
and they use a
multipronged
strategy to secure
their share of aid
nuggets. 
339907 Pa593_1stclass.qxp  5/9/2007  12:22 PM  Page 23
ment Block Grant (CDBG) funding formula
that helps rebuild older communities.”134
The CDBG program, which funds a range
of local development projects, illustrates how
technical the battles over aid can be. One
item in the formula that distributes CDBG
funding to the states is “housing built before
1940.” How did this obscure item get into the
CDBG formula? The Northeast-Midwest
Institute got a member of Congress to insert
it into legislation in 1977 in order to tilt aid
toward older cities.135
In 2006 a fight erupted over this housing
factor in the CDBG formula. The Bush admin-
istration wanted to change it because “many
poor communities have torn down old, blight-
ed housing while affluent communities have
rehabbed theirs, giving them a leg up in the dis-
tribution of funds.”136 But any proposed
change in formulas meets resistance. One news
story said that an official in wealthy Oak Park,
Illinois, was “shocked” and “stunned” that her
city would lose some of its CDBG subsidies
under the Bush proposal.137 No doubt she will
fight to block the change.
Every state argues that it gets the short end
of the stick from federal aid. The Northeast-
Midwest Institute found that Arizona gets an
inordinate amount of aid, but an Arizona
think tank, ThinkAZ, disputed that find-
ing.138 Meanwhile, the Public Policy Forum of
Southeastern Wisconsin argues that its region
is at a “competitive disadvantage” because of a
“failure to take full advantage of federal
grants.”139
The leaders of this Wisconsin group,
including government officials and corporate
executives, are following an aggressive strategy
to fix the problem. In its studies on federal aid,
the Public Policy Forum makes it sound as if
Wisconsin could not possibly grow without
Uncle Sam’s help. A recent report, “High-
Stakes Game of Risk,” says that “competitive
federal dollars drive economic growth . . . fed-
eral funding is a diverse source of capital that
fuels discovery and wealth creation.”140 The
report urges that local leaders build up their
bureaucracies in order to maximize inflows of
federal dollars:
Loosen purse strings. Federal funding
does not come cheap. The region needs
to raise “start-up” money to build orga-
nizational capacity (e.g. professional
grant writers), fiscal capacity (e.g. match-
ing funds to draw down federal dollars),
and infrastructure (e.g. research lab
space).141
The report goes on to flesh out that
“capacity building” strategy. It says that
Wisconsin organizations should hire grant
experts, travel to Washington two to four
times per year, and phone federal agencies
weekly. They should also raise private grant
money to hire the experts needed to “lever-
age” even bigger federal grants. Here is a suc-
cess story touted by the report:
The Private Industry Council of Mil-
waukee County received a $50,000 grant
from a local private foundation to hire a
professional grant writer to assemble a
competitive grant application for a job
training program. This relatively modest
downpayment of $50,000 aid paid off
with the PIC being awarded a 5-year $27
million grant from the U.S. Department
of Labor’s Employment and Training
Administration.142
Clearly, federalism has deteriorated into a
highly professionalized competitive battle
between the states—and against the federal tax-
payer. Taxpayers are also losers when state and
local interests join hands and cooperate to lobby
together. That is the purpose of groups such as
the National Conference of State Legislatures,
the National Governors Association, the
Council of State Governments, the National
League of Cities, the National Association of
Counties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors.
Those groups have a major presence in
Washington, and their efforts to increase spend-
ing on aid programs generate substantial news
coverage.
As an example of a recent joint lobbying
effort, those groups sent a letter to House
appropriators demanding a spending increase
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for the Emergency Management Performance
Grant program. The groups “urge your strong
support to provide $220 million for FY 2007 for
EMPG.”143 That funding level would represent
a 17 percent increase over the prior year’s level,
yet the groups argue that that is reasonable
because there is a “shortfall” in the program.
The aid advocacy industry also includes
high-priced lobbyists who are hired by state
and local governments. The number of state
and local governments that have hired
Washington lobbyists has doubled since
1998.144 One lobbying firm, Alcalde & Fay, has
a dedicated “Municipalities Practice Group,”
which generates $4 million annually in fees.
Such firms typically charge their state and
local government clients $10,000 to $20,000
per month. Alcalde & Fay boasts that it has
“secured billions of dollars in earmarked
appropriations and federal grants.”145
As a result of one scandal in 2006, we
learned that the State of Texas was paying
$30,000 a month to lobby Congress, with the
fees split between a Republican lobby shop
(the Federalist Group) and a Democratic
lobby shop (Cassidy and Associates).146 In
another scandal, we learned that a top appro-
priations lobbyist earned $1.7 million in fees
one year and that he received a $2 million sep-
aration agreement when he went to work for
then House Appropriations Committee chair-
man Jerry Lewis (R-CA).147 Lobbying for state
and local aid funding is big business.
Note the double hit that average taxpayers
endure for all this lobbying activity. As state
taxpayers, individuals are the ultimate source
of the fees paid by the states to the Washington
lobbying firms. As federal taxpayers, individu-
als are burdened to pay for all the extra federal
aid spending that the lobbyists secure. 
Because the federal budget is a gold mine
for the states, it is not surprising that state and
local officials invest in high-priced prospec-
tors. Consulting firms, specialized grants soft-
ware, and trade publications are geared
toward helping the states win federal aid. One
consulting firm, Management Concepts,
offers 20 different courses on aspects of feder-
al grants.148 The website of another consulting
firm, Maximus, describes a range of grant-
related services it offers to its state and local
clients including “revenue maximization.”149
This firm’s sales brochure boasts that it has
“identified and secured $1.5 billion in federal
funding for states.”150 A search of the Internet
turns up dozens of other consulting and soft-
ware firms eager to help clients win federal aid
such as www.freegovmoney.us.
Perhaps the most successful prospector for
the states is Gerald Cassidy, cofounder of the
Washington lobbying firm Cassidy and
Associates. The firm has been the focus of a
recent series of articles in the Washington Post.151
Cassidy and his firm pioneered the now-com-
mon practice of earmarking money for state
and local spending projects in the federal budg-
et. Cassidy’s efforts have enabled him to amass
a personal fortune of $125 million.
The Washington Post series reveals that the
expansion of federal spending on state and
local activities has not been driven just by
activist politicians on Capitol Hill. Entrepre-
neurial lobbyists, such as Cassidy, have played a
key role in advancing the process by pro-active-
ly selling their services to universities and other
local institutions across the country. These
days, state and local officials know that
Washington lobbyists are helping most other
jurisdictions secure federal cash, so if they sit
on their hands or are squeamish about paying
for lobbyists, they will lose out.   
The time has long passed when state poli-
cymakers would jealously guard the indepen-
dence of state activities and resist federal
encroachment. These days, the priority of the
states is to use every means available to
squeeze more money from federal taxpayers.
State officials have complained about the
onerous rules of the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2002, and 30 state legislatures passed
resolutions attacking NCLB for undermin-
ing states’ rights. But the states did not call
for repeal of the education law, they simply
demanded more federal aid money to spend
on NCLB implementation. 
Trade Associations and Unions
Working in tandem with state and local
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governments is a huge array of trade associa-
tions and unions that represent activities
dependent on federal aid. While it is illegal to
directly use federal aid funds for lobbying, it is
easy to get around that rule by forming a non-
profit organization consisting of those indi-
viduals and groups that receive aid. There are
thousands of such organizations that push to
increase spending on aid programs.
Among the most powerful advocates for aid
are the unions that represent state and local
workers. The largest is the National Education
Association, which has 3.2 million members, a
staff of 555, and a budget of more than $300
million.152 The NEA influences federal policy
through publications, meetings with legisla-
tors, contributions to candidates, conferences,
and grants to other groups that favor higher
aid spending. NEA’s website says that in 1867
it “won its first major legislative victory when it
successfully lobbied Congress to establish a
federal Department of Education.”153 (The fed-
eral agency’s title was changed to the Office of
Education in 1869.) Like many labor unions,
the NEA both lobbies for expanded aid and is
an aid recipient itself. The NEA receives federal
grants for worker training, substance abuse
programs, and other activities.154
Associations of state and local government
agencies also promote aid spending. Consider
the National Association of State Departments
of Agriculture. This group, which is composed
of state government agriculture officials, was
founded in 1915, opened a Washington office
in 1968, and has an annual budget of $1.9 mil-
lion.155 The group lobbies Congress for more
farm aid to the states through meetings on
Capitol Hill, letters to top federal officials, and
other activities.
Another organization of this type is the
National WIC Association.156 WIC is a feder-
al aid program started in 1974 to provide
nutritional food for women, infants, and
children. The National WIC Association is an
umbrella group for the 2,000 state and local
government agencies that administer the
WIC program. This association drafts studies
on the importance of the WIC program,
advocates its positions to federal policymak-
ers, and holds conferences in Washington.
The group’s 2006 legislative agenda docu-
ment is entitled “WIC at RISK! A Healthy,
Strong America in Jeopardy!” The document
“recommends a FY 2007 funding level for
WIC of $5.388 billion” and predicts dire con-
sequences if policymakers don’t go along.157
Another group is the National Association
of Housing and Redevelopment Officials.
This group’s webpage says that “for more than
60 years the National Association of Housing
and Redevelopment Officials has fought to
secure needed housing and community devel-
opment programs.”158 NAHRO was founded
in 1933 and lobbied successfully to get new
federal aid programs enacted under President
Franklin Roosevelt. Today it has a $5 million
budget and 40 employees in its Washington
office.
NAHRO’s website says that its members
are those who “administer HUD programs
such as Public Housing, Section 8, CDBG
and HOME.” Members include both individ-
uals and the government agencies that they
work for. Thus, like other trade associations,
that means that NAHRO is ultimately sup-
ported by taxpayers as it lobbies for greater
federal subsidies, and thus higher taxes.
NAHRO is a large and sophisticated group
with 43 state chapters, eight regional coun-
cils, and 20,000 members. Its 2006 legislative
guide is a glossy 16-page document that rec-
ommends exactly how much Congress
should spend on each related aid program.
In addition to these sorts of groups, there
are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of trade
associations that represent the private-sector
grantees and contractors that depend on fed-
eral aid. Considering just highway construc-
tion, there are dozens of organizations that
lobby for increased federal aid. There are 27
groups in the Transportation Construction
Coalition, including the American Concrete
Pavement Association, the National Asphalt
Paving Association, and the Portland Cement
Association.159
One member in this coalition is the
American Road and Transportation Builders
Association. It was founded in 1902 and
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helped to pass the first major highway aid bill
in 1916. It has been pushing for increased
highway spending ever since and currently
has a Washington office with 36 employees
and a $5 million budget.160 The organiza-
tion’s membership includes state govern-
ment agencies, highway contractors, and
engineering firms. ARTBA’s website states its
mission clearly:
From its inception, ARTBA took a very
active role in lobbying for the interests of
the transportation construction indus-
try. . . . ARTBA helped pass the Federal-
Aid Road Act of 1916, which established
the first sizeable appropriation of feder-
al funds for road improvements and
cemented the federal government’s role
in transportation development. Since
1916, ARTBA has been a major force in
the development of all federal trans-
portation policy and legislation.161
In addition to the lobbying groups that
focus on aid spending, there are hundreds of
groups that focus on aid-related regulations.
For example, there are many groups that lobby
to attach safety and environmental require-
ments to federal highway laws. One group is the
National Alliance of Highway Beautification
Agencies.162 It appears to be composed of
employees of state transportation departments
whose mission is to defend the restrictions put
on highway billboards passed as part of a 1965
federal highway aid bill.
State Spending Incentives
The basic incentive structure of aid pro-
grams encourages both federal and state
politicians to increase spending. Federal
politicians try to maximize the impact of aid
by including provisions that prompt the
states to increase their own funding of pro-
grams. By inducing the states to spend more,
federal policymakers can make programs
look more successful and win greater special
interest support. 
To that end, Congress often includes
“matching” provisions in aid programs,
which means that the costs of expansion are
split between federal and state taxpayers.
Under a 50-50 arrangement, for every $2 mil-
lion spent in total on a program, the federal
government chips in $1 million. Matching
reduces the “price” to state officials of pro-
gram expansion and prompts them to
demand more spending. If the federal match
is open-ended, states can expand programs
continually. Two-thirds of federal aid spend-
ing is on grant programs that have matching
requirements.163
That incentive for expansion has been an
acute problem in Medicaid. The match for
Medicaid varies by state—higher-income states
receive a one-to-one match, while poorer states
receive up to three dollars of federal aid for
each dollar of state funding.164 On average, the
states receive $1.30 in federal funding for every
additional dollar they spend on Medicaid
from their own funds. 
The federal aid match has provided a huge
incentive for profligacy in Medicaid. States are
encouraged to expand benefits for lower prior-
ity activities and to expand eligibility to those
with higher incomes.165 The executive director
of the National Governors Association noted
that states have expanded the program so
much that “approximately 60 percent on aver-
age of any given state’s Medicaid budget is
taken up by optional services and/or optional
populations.”166 Medicaid enrollment has
increased 40 percent nationwide in just the
past five years.167 Federal spending on
Medicaid has grown at an enormous annual
average rate of 10 percent since 1990, and rapid
growth is expected to continue.168
Another spending incentive built into
numerous aid programs is maintenance-of-
effort (MOE) provisions. Those rules are
designed to prevent states from reducing
their own support for activities after they
receive federal funding for them. If the feder-
al government provides aid for a school read-
ing program, it doesn’t want the states to
reduce their own funding of reading pro-
grams. MOE rules try to ensure that states
maintain or increase their own funding of an
activity. One effect is that the states have few
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incentives to find lower-cost ways of deliver-
ing services because MOE rules bar them
from reducing spending.
The precise degree to which aid increases
government spending has been the subject of
much academic debate.169 If the states took
federal aid money and partly substituted it for
their own spending, total government spend-
ing would rise by less than the aid amount.
That is more likely to occur with block grants,
which is one reason why many federal policy-
makers don’t favor block grants. But most of
the time, the matching and MOE provisions,
the general political incentives for spending,
and the lobbying industry surrounding each
program all ensure that aid expands govern-
ment at every level.170
If federal aid programs were eliminated,
total government spending in the United
States would likely decline substantially. Many
states would step in and replace a portion of
previous federal funding of programs with
their own funding. But without federal subsi-
dies, most states would reduce program
spending to more reasonable levels. State
responses to prior aid cuts support this view. A
detailed analysis of the federal aid cuts of the
early 1980s indicated that overall spending on
the targeted activities fell as the states replaced
only a modest portion of prior aid with their
own funding.171 Similarly, a statistical study of
federal welfare, which was converted from an
open-ended matching program to a block
grant in 1996, indicated that the reform sub-
stantially reduced state spending compared to
what it would have been without reform.172
To the extent that federal aid programs
draw state funds away from other unsubsi-
dized state activities, they put a wedge
between the preferences of state residents
and the choices of state policymakers. State
policymakers know that if they spend $1 on a
state-funded service it buys $1 of that service,
but if they spend $1 of their own funds on an
activity that comes with a federal match, it
will buy $2 of that service. As a result, state
policymakers don’t provide residents with
the optimal mix of services that they really
want and are willing to pay for.
This distortionary effect of federal aid has
been observed for decades. In 1940 a Congres-
sional Quarterly article on federal aid noted:
Evidence indicates that under the
matching system the states tend to
spend disproportionate amounts of
money on these services, to the detri-
ment of equally important activities
which do not receive federal aid. The
effect of federal subsidies, therefore, is
to give certain public services a pre-
ferred position in state budgets.173
In the 1980s Ed Koch, then mayor of New
York City, complained that federal aid drew
cities into expensive commitments for social
spending and fancy new infrastructure, while
diverting city funds from core responsibili-
ties.174 And federal aid often funds infra-
structure construction costs but not operat-
ing costs, thus creating future burdens on
taxpayers. If a $100 million grant pays for a
new light rail system in a state, it would cost
federal taxpayers $100 million, but it may
also cost state taxpayers years worth of oper-
ating subsidies.
As the federal government has subsidized
more state activities over time, it has created
an unhealthy political dynamic. Those who
support activities that are state funded may
feel shortchanged when they compare their
situation with those lavished with federal
funds. As a result, they will lobby for the
establishment of their own federal aid pro-
grams. In this way, aid programs beget more
aid programs, and more state and local activ-
ities are drawn in the federal aid vortex over
time.175
No Incentives for Cost Control
State and local governments have little
incentive to be frugal with aid received from
the federal government. As a result, there has
always been substantial waste in federal aid
programs. Even under the federal land grants
of the 19th century, the states were “prodi-
gal” with some engaging in “wildcat specula-
tion.”176
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In recent years, wasteful spending on aid
programs has often been in the news. In 2006
the inspector general of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development looked at
the Community Development Block Grant
program and found that fraud by local gov-
ernments and private grantees was common
and increasing.177
There have been frequent reports of waste
in homeland security aid programs. A 2005
Washington Post analysis of $324 million given
to the District of Columbia for security found
spending on leather jackets for police, sum-
mer jobs programs for teenagers, purchases of
excess emergency vehicles, and “lucrative con-
sulting contracts for political figures.”178
Similarly, a federal auditor reported that
Virginia distributed its homeland security aid
sloppily, with spending on such items as cell
phones, televisions, and T-shirts.179
In March, Reps. Anthony Weiner (D-NY)
and Jeff Flake (R-AZ) unveiled a list of wasteful
projects funded with federal homeland securi-
ty grants.180 The list included such items as
security cameras for a fishing village in Alaska,
a truck for a local government employee in
Indiana to drive to work, a trailer to support
lawnmower drag races in Texas, security for a
bingo hall in Kentucky, and nutritional coun-
seling for police in Indiana.  
The basic problem is that federal aid is
“free” money to state and local officials. In a
story about federal relief aid after Hurricane
Katrina, the Washington Post quoted a former
top FEMA official observing that “experience
shows that local officials spend more freely
when they expect the federal government to
pay the bills.”181
The greatest waste in the federal aid system
can be found in the largest aid program,
Medicaid. Because the federal government
pays more than half of Medicaid’s costs, the
states don’t worry too much about the pro-
gram’s rampant fraud and abuse. A 2003 inves-
tigation found that fraud in California’s
Medicaid program costs about $1 billion
annually.182 The New York Times reported in
2005 that between 10 and 40 percent of New
York State’s Medicaid budget of $45 billion
may be lost to fraud and abuse.183 The Times
story made it clear that the state has little
incentive to control those problems, and hires
few auditors to do so.
Investigations have revealed large abuses in
Medicaid’s subsidies for transportation for visits
to doctors. The federal government pays 70 per-
cent of those costs. A recent audit found that the
District of Columbia spent $16 million for these
services in 2005 with virtually no paper trails or
completed claim forms.184 During the year,
8,607 D.C. residents were reimbursed for
427,898 trips, or about 50 trips each. Appar-
ently, some people are using Medicaid trans-
portation as a free taxi service for visiting friends,
shopping, and other routine activities.
The states themselves have concocted abu-
sive schemes to rip off federal taxpayers
through Medicaid. They create mechanisms to
inappropriately boost their federal matching
payments.185 For example, some states institut-
ed “taxes” on health care providers that were
rebated back to the providers. The effect was to
increase reported state Medicaid spending and
boost federal matching aid. States continue to
operate such schemes despite a decade of criti-
cism by the federal government.
The wasteful manner in which the states
treat federal aid funding is evident in the large
cost overruns on federally funded transporta-
tion projects.186 In 1994 Virginia officials
claimed that the Springfield interchange proj-
ect would cost $241 million, but the cost
ended up being at least $676 million.187 The
cost of New York’s Penn Station redevelop-
ment has more than doubled, and the project
is years behind schedule. The GAO found that
half of the federally funded highway projects it
examined in recent years had cost overruns of
more than 25 percent.188
The most infamous cost overrun was
Boston’s “Big Dig” or Central Artery project.
In 1985 officials claimed that the Big Dig
would cost $2.6 billion and be completed by
1998. The cost ultimately ballooned to $14.6
billion, and the project continues to have
engineering problems. The federal share of
the cost was $8.5 billion. The state of
Massachusetts grossly mismanaged the Big
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Dig.189 It repeatedly bailed out bungling
highway contractors and essentially reward-
ed them for cost overruns with guaranteed
profits.
Nonetheless, the ultimate reaponsibility
for wasteful spending of federal aid lies with
Congress. Congress can cut aid programs
anytime it wants. But it doesn’t because its
political incentives are upside down—cost
overruns on federal projects are positive ben-
efits to members of Congress who have aid
activities in their states. For example, cost
overruns on the Big Dig meant more federal
money flowing to Massachusetts, which was
a political benefit to members from the state
such as former House Speaker and project
champion Tip O’Neill (D-MA). 
Members of Congress have little interest
in the efficiency of federal spending in their
states. Wasteful Medicaid spending in New
York means more federal funding for the
constituents of New York politicians. More
federal aid means more government-funded
jobs for hometown voters. In sum, programs
funded with federal aid include no incentives
for cost control up or down the management
chain of government. 
Bureaucracies and
Regulations
The desire of federal legislators to address
countless problems in society has led to the
creation of the huge aid system. Policymakers
make it sound easy when they declare that a
new aid program will help solve a problem,
but it is another thing to actually implement a
program efficiently and get positive results.
Consider President Bush’s $150 million aid
program, the Healthy Marriage Initiative.190 It
would not be surprising if most of the pro-
gram’s funds are consumed by analysts,
lawyers, consultants, and other high-paid
bureaucrats. They will create proposals, write
studies, litigate, evaluate, and audit, and the
average married couple in the heartland will
never even hear about the program. 
And what if auditors find out that the
healthy marriage program doesn’t work? It
will be a struggle to kill it because it has
hooked hundreds of lower governments and
nonprofit groups on a lucrative flow of fund-
ing. That funding will be vigorously defend-
ed by the churches, Indian tribes, communi-
ty groups, and ethnic organizations that are
on the healthy marriage gravy train.191
Federal Bureaucracies
At the top of the aid food chain, federal
agencies busy themselves awarding grants,
calculating grant formulas, writing regula-
tions, evaluating programs, and other tasks.
Agencies need to monitor the states to ensure
compliance with aid rules, and they need to
impose penalties when the rules are broken.
Each project grant needs a panel of experts to
review proposals and make grant awards.
Formula grants require extensive data collec-
tion to accumulate the information needed
for grant formulas. A GAO summary of fed-
eral grant formulas is 422 pages long.192
The main goal of federal agencies is to
shovel aid out the door as fast as possible. If
they don’t, they will be hounded by politi-
cians and interest groups. Every federal
department holds conferences and runs web-
sites to help recipients get all the aid they can.
They publish guidebooks and an endless
series of memos to help grantees sort their
way through the labyrinth of aid procedures
and regulations.193
The Department of Agriculture’s $30 bil-
lion food stamp program provides an illustra-
tion of how agencies encourage aid spending.
Apparently, only 60 percent of those eligible
for food stamps participate. One reason is
that the states make applicants jump through
a few hoops in order to receive benefits.194 But
the USDA encourages states to lower their
screening standards and hand out more sub-
sidies. For example, it recently provided
waivers to some states allowing them to sign
up food stamp recipients over the telephone
and Internet, instead of requiring recipients
to appear in person at an office. The USDA
also provides bonuses to states that increase
their food stamp participation rates.
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It is not known exactly how much all these
federal rulemaking and administrative tasks
cost federal taxpayers. Federal administra-
tion costs for the aid system come on top of
the $449 billion cost of federal grants them-
selves. Past estimates of aid administration
costs indicate a wide variation between pro-
grams.195
One way to estimate administration costs
is to look at agencies whose main purpose is to
distribute aid. Consider the Department of
Education, which has no teachers and runs no
schools. Its purpose is to oversee 146 educa-
tion grant programs, which are described in a
department guidebook that is 490 pages
long.196 One can look at budget data for par-
ticular programs to get an estimate of federal
administrative costs. For the Safe and Drug-
Free Schools program, administrative costs
are about 8 percent of the value of grants
handed out.197 English Language Acquisition
grants have a similar 8 percent federal admin-
istrative cost. Another program, Safe Schools
Healthy Students, distributed $94 million in
grants in 2004, while paying a consultant $10
million to evaluate the program.198
Here is a sampling of the administrative
costs of other federal grant programs:
• The Economic Development Administra-
tion distributed $361 million of grants in
2006, while incurring administration
costs of $31 million, or 9 percent of the
grant value.199
• The Institute of Museum and Library
Services distributed $238 million of
grants in 2006, while incurring adminis-
trative costs of $12 million, or 5 percent
of the grant value.200
• The Appalachian Regional Commission
distributed $71 million of grants in
2006, while incurring administrative
costs of $5 million, or 7 percent of the
grant value.201
• The Justice Department’s Weed and
Seed anti-drug program distributed $50
million of grants in 2006, while incur-
ring administrative costs of $11 million,
or 22 percent of the grant value.202
This small sample of programs suggests
that federal administrative costs account for 5
to 10 percent or more of federal grant
amounts. Thus, if federal administrative costs
of the $449 billion aid system were 10 percent,
that would mean an added $44.9 billion bur-
den on taxpayers, and put the overall costs of
the aid system at about $500 billion. 
However, federal costs are only a part of
overall aid administration costs. Aid flows
down to the states and then often through
one or two layers of local government. Local
governments consume some of the aid funds
on in-house bureaucracy and then often dis-
perse the rest to private contractors and
grantees. Funding for the largest education
aid program, Title I, flows to state govern-
ments, then to city and county governments,
and finally to school districts and individual
schools. A portion of federal community
development aid flows to state governments,
then down to local governments, and finally
out to nonprofit groups and businesses.
At each level, government agencies and pri-
vate organizations keep a portion of funding
for their administrative costs. Federal rules
sometimes specify the share of funding that
may be used by recipients for administrative
costs, and 10 percent seems to be common.
Considering all the administrative costs at all
layers of government and private organiza-
tions, it would not be surprising if much of the
aid budget disappeared before any actual work
is done. Of course, separating administration
costs from active program costs is a tricky and
somewhat ambiguous task. If an aid program
doesn’t work as planned, then the entire cost
of the program is essentially an administrative
write-off from a taxpayer’s perspective.
State and Local Bureaucracies
Most of the “bureaucracy” in American
government is at the state and local level. State
and local governments employ 16 million
workers, far more than the 1.8 million civilians
employed by the federal government. Figure 5
shows that, while the number of federal work-
ers has been roughly constant for decades, the
number of state and local workers has soared.
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The pattern is substantially explained by the
huge growth in federal aid and the need for
state and local governments to comply with
masses of aid-related regulations.
How many state and local workers owe
their jobs to federal aid and related regula-
tions? Given that aid represents 22 percent of
state and local budgets, a rough estimate is
that 22 percent of state and local workers, or
3.5 million, owe their jobs to aid. Paul Light
of the Brookings Institution very roughly
estimated that 4.7 million state and local
workers handled federal aid and regula-
tions.203 Either way, it appears that there are
many more bureaucrats doing federally
sponsored work in state and local govern-
ments than in the federal government.  
Figure 5 shows that the trends of educa-
tion and noneducation employment in state
and local government have been similar in
recent decades. Employment soared during
the 1960s and early 1970s, slowed in the early
1980s, and began growing again in the late
1980s. Note that these growth patterns are
similar to the patterns of federal aid spend-
ing shown in Figures 3 and 4, suggesting that
aid is an important cause of the growth in
state and local bureaucracies.
As aid expanded in the 1960s, huge num-
bers of state and local workers were needed to
administer the new programs and to comply
with aid-related regulations. State and local
governments boosted staffing in order to
write grant proposals, implement programs,
draft progress reports for federal agencies,
track the federal budget, and many other
tasks. The share of state agencies in the 50
states that receives some federal subsidies
increased from 34 percent in 1964, to 63 per-
cent by 1974, and to 79 percent by 2004.204
The expansion of state bureaucracies in the
1960s was not an unforeseen side effect of ris-
ing federal aid; it was an intended purpose of
aid—aid was “an intentionally stimulative
instrument.”205 Experts thought that state
and local governments should be “modern-
ized,” meaning that they needed large new
bureaus of administrators. In a 1966 speech,
top White House official Harold Seidman
lamented that state and local governments
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were poorly suited to the “complex conditions
or modern life.”206 To his way of thinking, they
had backwards structures such as biennial leg-
islative sessions and part-time legislators.
Seidman argued that the federal government
“should do more to support efforts to
enhance the quality of state and local admin-
istration.”207 The states should become better
“partners” by hiring more staff, creating “com-
prehensive plans,” and establishing new agen-
cies to receive federal aid. 
Seidman recognized that the expansion of
federal aid was creating problems. He said that
aid programs had become a “jungle” of incon-
sistency, overlap, and duplication. But his
solutions were characteristic of the 1960s—the
jungle should be tamed by more experts, more
planning, and more government structures.
The growth in federal aid spurred the cre-
ation of new agencies in state and local gov-
ernments, including agencies for urban renew-
al, public housing, and anti-poverty efforts.208
New agencies were needed to draft grand
plans describing how states would spend fed-
eral aid funds. For example, a 1968 crime bill
mandated that to receive aid governors must
create new state planning offices. 
Aid programs sometimes cut across the
jurisdictions of existing state and local agen-
cies, so new government structures had to be
created. And states often needed to change
laws to give agencies the added powers they
needed to comply with aid regulations.209 One
study found that there were 51 different types
of agency common to state governments in
the 1950s, but today states usually have more
than 100 different types of agencies to carry
out a much broader array of activities.210
There continues to be federal and state
pressure on state agencies to beef up their aid
bureaucracies. A 2003 report by the California
state auditor argues that state agency staffing
should be increased in order to maximize
inflows of federal aid.211 The auditor found
that agencies needed more staff to apply for
grants and to create the planning documents
needed to be eligible for aid.212 For example,
local governments needed to create “continu-
um of care plans” to be eligible for federal
homeless persons grants.213 Federal agencies
have lobbied California to increase agency
staffing in order to meet federal requirements.
The expansion of aid over the decades has
led to the creation of new layers of government
in the United States. Thousands of water
authorities, public housing authorities, con-
servation districts, air quality regions, and
other structures were created partly in
response to the expansion of federal aid.214
Such structures were created to receive federal
aid and to operate independent of city and
county governments. The number of such spe-
cial district government units increased from
12,000 in 1952, to 24,000 in 1972, and to
35,000 by 2002.215
The proliferation of state and local agen-
cies and special districts has undermined the
ability of state and local officials to manage
government finances. Officials can’t reallocate
funds to improve government efficiency
because the mass of federal rules and funding
sources has balkanized their operations. At the
same time, officials have fewer incentives to
pursue state and local cost savings these days
because budget needs can be met by securing
additional funding from Washington.
The rise in aid has produced disjointed
and uncoordinated government actions. The
GAO argues, for example, that the array of 16
separate aid programs for first responders
has created fragmented disaster response
planning.216 With many state agencies being
supported by aid, communication channels
have become vertical to the federal govern-
ment rather than horizontal across state and
local agencies. Federal aid disenfranchises
state and local elected officials because they
are bypassed by federal funds that flow to
state and local agencies.217
Federal aid funds 29 percent of state budg-
ets, and federal and state aid together funds
44 percent of local budgets.218 That means
that large parts of state and local budgets are
beyond the direct control of the correspond-
ing elected officials. Aid denies state and local
leaders the ability to make tradeoffs regarding
the costs and benefits of government services.
At the same time, aid suppresses government
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accountability. When every level of govern-
ment is responsible for a program, experience
indicates that no level of government takes
responsibility when failures occur.
Private Bureaucracies
The federal aid system also causes bureau-
cratic growth in private organizations that
receive funding. Federal money trickles down
through state governments, then local gov-
ernments, and finally to private businesses
and nonprofit groups. These private organi-
zations deal with a mass of aid-related paper-
work—grant proposals, regulatory compli-
ance, performance reporting, auditing, and
other activities.
The federal government encourages the
building of state, local, and private bureauc-
racies through the funding of “capacity
building.” There are entire grant programs
devoted to capacity building for environmen-
tal groups, foreign aid contractors, Indian
tribes, and other sorts of aid recipients.219
Consider a 2005 press release from the
Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment: “HUD Awards Nearly $24 million for
Affordable Housing and Economic Develop-
ment.”220 Looking at the details, it is clear that
most of those HUD grants went toward hiring
administrators and not actually building any
housing. An Indian tribe in Alaska received
$150,000 to “create a management position for
the department. Activities include reviewing
internal policies and procedures, and with the
assistance of The McDowell Group, developing a
strategic plan.” A Daytona Beach housing agency
received $150,000 “to provide staff training, eco-
nomic development and strategic planning as
well as coalition building.” 
President Bush’s initiative to give subsidies
to faith-based organizations is similarly
focused on building up bureaucracies. A cen-
terpiece of the initiative is the Compassion
Capital Fund, which funds “intermediary
organizations that provide capacity-building
assistance to faith-based and community
organizations. Intermediary organizations
serve as a bridge between the federal govern-
ment and faith-based and community organi-
zations.”221 Thus far, the CCF has funded 44
such middleman groups.222 One is the Ohio
Compassion Capital Project administered by
the Governor’s Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives in that state. Another
is JVA Consulting LLC of Denver, which has
received more than $2 million to hold work-
shops for community organizations to help
build their “organizational capacity.”223
All in all, the president’s initiative has
hooked 4,300 “faith-based and community
organizations” on the federal dole.224 In a
recent award of $58 million to 442 groups,
taxpayer dollars were sent to such organiza-
tions as the Bach Viet Association, the East
Bay Spanish Speaking Citizens Association,
the Muslim American Society Boston, the
Utah Federation for Youth, and United Way
Silicon Valley.225 President Bush argues that
his subsidies are building an “Army of
Compassion,” but they are also building an
army of lobbyists that will push for higher
federal aid spending. 
The Burden of Federal Regulations
A primary activity of state and local work-
ers is dealing with the mass of aid-related reg-
ulations imposed by the federal government.
There are three types of aid regulations.226 The
first are the specific rules for each program,
such as the rules for disabled access that come
with transit aid. Each program may come with
hundreds or thousands of pages of rules for
grantees to follow. The regulations for the $11
billion Individuals with Disabilities Education
program are 1,700 pages long.227 The $61 mil-
lion Weed and Seed anti-drug grant program
has a 74-page application kit that references
1,300 pages of regulations.228 The Byrne aid
program operated by the Department of
Justice has a 58-page application kit that refer-
ences 1,000 pages of regulations.
One can get a sense of how complex the
rules for each aid program are by examining
the websites of federal, state, and local agen-
cies that administer the programs. For
Community Development Block Grants, state
and local agencies publish many lengthy
guidebooks and planning documents, and
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they evaluate thousands of funding proposals
by grantees. The State of Virginia’s CDBG
manual is 170 pages long.229 The forms and
guidance for CBDG grantees in Virginia are
132 pages long.230
“Crosscutting requirements” are a second
type of regulation that come with federal aid.
These are general provisions that apply across
many aid programs, such as employment and
labor market rules. Davis-Bacon requirements
that set minimum wages on federal projects
are a good example. There are dozens of cross-
cutting regulations on federal aid that grantees
must comply with.
“Crossover sanctions” are a third type of
aid regulation. Under these rules, cuts to fed-
eral aid are imposed if certain federal regula-
tory requirements are not met. For example,
under a 1965 law the federal government
threatened to cut highway aid to those states
that did not follow new guidelines on bill-
board advertising. The federal government
made a similar threat to those states that did
not impose a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit
under a 1974 law. (The national speed limit
was repealed in 1995.)
The growth in aid-related regulations has
been very good for the legal industry. Grant
law became a hot area in the 1970s as a result
of the explosion in grant litigation.231 As is
tax law, grant law is complex partly because
lobbyists work to carve out narrow benefits
and exceptions to the rules. Also, judicial
developments in the 1970s opened the flood-
gates to court activity related to aid. There
was an increase in third-party challenges to
crosscutting aid regulations, such as those
related to discrimination and environmental
rules. There have also been many legal dis-
putes between grantees and federal agencies.
Consider, for example, that the National
Head Start Association, which defends the
Head Start aid program, has its own Legal
Advisory Service.232 The service exists to pro-
vide legal training and legal guidance for the
recipients of Head Start subsidies.
The high costs and intrusiveness of aid-
related regulations have caused great con-
cern. The states have occasionally challenged
the federal government over particularly
onerous regulations, but a 1923 Supreme
Court case established that aid-related rules
are constitutional because state participation
in aid programs is voluntary.233 More recent-
ly, a 1984 highway law threatened to cut aid
to those states that did not raise their drink-
ing ages to 21. South Dakota challenged the
regulation, but a 1987 Supreme Court deci-
sion sided with the federal government and
approved the law—notwithstanding that the
21st Amendment to the Constitution gave
the states the power to regulate alcohol.234
Aid-related rules have been found to be
constitutional, but there is no doubt that
they are very costly. For example, state offi-
cials have long complained about the cost of
rules tied to education aid. A former educa-
tion official in Arizona noted that 45 percent
of the state’s employees dealt with federal aid
programs, but that those programs account-
ed for just 6 percent of state education
spending.235 A Florida education official sim-
ilarly complained about 
the crushing burden caused by too
many federal regulations, procedures,
and mandates. Florida spends millions
of dollars every year to administer
inflexible, categorical federal programs
that divert precious dollars away from
raising student achievement . . . there
are 297 state employees to oversee and
administer approximately $1 billion in
federal funds. By contrast, we have 394
state-funded positions to oversee and
administer approximately $7 billion in
state funds.236
Aid for special education—that is, for those
students with disabilities—is an area of partic-
ularly large regulatory costs. Federal regula-
tions require that states provide an extensive
array of special education services, and even
must provide legal support for parents who
think that schools aren’t doing enough for
their children. The result is “a lawyers’ play-
ground” that overidentifies target recipients
and is subject to rapidly rising costs.237 One
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expert called special education “an empire
controlled by lawyers, bureaucrats, and inter-
est groups.”238 The National Conference of
State Legislatures argues that federal rules for
special education cost them billions of dollars
more to implement than they receive in feder-
al aid.239
The states have complained bitterly about
the high costs of the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2002. The act requires that all teachers be
“highly qualified,” that Spanish-language ver-
sions of tests be administered, and that certain
children have after-school tutoring. The NCSL
argues that the act’s requirements have cost
the states $22 billion but that the federal gov-
ernment has covered only $12 billion of those
costs.240 Fairfax County, Virginia, claims that
the act cost it $132 million over the first five
years, but that the federal government gave the
county only $9 million in related aid.241 Such
claims may or may not be accurate, but
American taxpayers bear the costs of pro-
grams and regulations whichever level of gov-
ernment imposes them.
Since the 1970s, the states have complained
about the high costs of “mandates” imposed
on them from Washington. That phrase often
means both aid-related regulations and other
legal requirements that impose costs on lower
governments and the private sector. Other
legal requirements include “direct orders” to
implement such things as federal labor stan-
dards under the threat of civil or criminal
penalties and “partial preemptions,” which set
general standards but allow states to establish
their own rules to meet the standards, as under
the Clean Air Act of 1970.
The difference between regulations related
to aid programs and the federal government
simply commanding states to perform certain
actions is not always clear-cut. The NCSL
notes that with respect to federal disabilities
aid programs, if a state refused to participate,
it would open itself up to lawsuits for not
complying with federal civil rights laws.242 For
this reason and others, the states usually feel
compelled to join federal aid programs.
Both federal aid and federal mandates
exploded after 1960. The ACIR noted that
“during the 1960s and 1970s, state and local
governments, for the first time, were brought
under extensive federal regulatory con-
trols.”243 By one estimate the number of feder-
al mandates on lower governments had risen
to 1,259 by 1980, of which 1,036 were aid-
related rules and 223 were direct orders.244
By the 1980s there were loud calls to cut
the high costs of federal regulations and man-
dates. The Reagan administration promised
to provide regulatory relief, and it made
progress in some areas. Yet the ACIR found
that there were more statutes with major man-
dates passed during the 1980s (27) than
passed during the 1970s (22) or the 1960s
(12).245 ACIR lamented that federal courts
“became involved regularly in telling state and
local governments what they must do, not just
what they must not do,” and that states
became “virtually powerless to challenge feder-
al action in the courts on Tenth Amendment
grounds.”246 In 1993 an ACIR report found
that unfunded federal mandates had
reached such proportions as to consti-
tute an overextension of the constitu-
tionally delegated powers of the
Congress and the Executive, an abridge-
ment of the authority of citizens in their
state and local communities to govern
their own affairs, and an impairment of
the ability of citizens to hold their elect-
ed federal officials accountable for the
public costs of their decisions. This
development is new and alarming. Even
more alarming is the weight of recent
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court
toward the view that constitutional lim-
its on the federal government’s powers
are nonjusticiable, even though the
Constitution is founded on the premise
that the power of the federal govern-
ment should be limited by the primary
reach of state authority.247
Policymakers took those concerns seri-
ously, and the new Republican congressional
majority in 1995 promised once again to cut
mandates and revive federalism. Their main
36
The states have
complained about
the high costs 
of “mandates”
imposed on 
them from
Washington. That
phrase often
means both 
aid-related 
regulations and
other legal
requirements that
impose costs 
on lower govern-
ments and the
private sector.
339907 Pa593_1stclass.qxp  5/9/2007  12:22 PM  Page 36
achievement on the regulatory front was the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.
The act requires that official estimates of the
costs of mandates be available during con-
gressional consideration of bills, and it cre-
ates some procedural hurdles for bills that
include mandates with substantial costs.  
UMRA may have deterred some costly
new rules from being imposed, but its bene-
fits have been modest. For one thing,
Congress has voted to put aside UMRA and
impose new mandates whenever it has want-
ed to, such as for a minimum wage increase
in 1996. Also, UMRA did not include aid-
related regulations under its definition of
“mandate,” and thus it didn’t do anything to
tame the high costs of the federal aid empire.
Today, the federal government continues
to impose hundreds of mandates and aid-
related rules on state and local governments
every year. By one count, federal agencies typ-
ically impose more than 800 new rules and
regulations on state and local governments
each year.248 The largest rule generators are
the Environmental Protection Agency and
the Departments of Agriculture, Interior,
Health and Human Services, and Homeland
Security. Rough estimates of the total costs
of unfunded mandates to state and local gov-
ernments have been up to $800 billion.249
However, one should scrutinize all claims
of mandate costs to understand what is
included. For example, the states often claim
that if federal appropriations for a program
fall short of an amount previously author-
ized, it constitutes a “mandate.” The No
Child Left Behind Act authorized $116 bil-
lion of federal spending over six years, but
Congress appropriated “only” $73 billion.
Liberal interest groups have complained that
this “funding shortfall” is an “unfunded
mandate” on the states.250 But these com-
plaints about NCLB do not have the interests
of taxpayers in mind—it is taxpayers who
fund all government programs and ultimate-
ly bear the costs of all mandates. If the feder-
al government were to spend more on NCLB,
it would impose higher costs on taxpayers. 
The important point to remember is that
the costs of federal involvement in state and
local activities are higher than just the direct
costs of aid. State and local governments
spend billions of dollars annually dealing with
federal aid regulations and mandates, and
that imposes burdens on taxpayers above and
beyond the $449 billion annual costs of feder-
al grants themselves.
Let’s look at federal aid from the bottom
up by considering Fairfax County, Virginia. In
2005 the county received $230 million from
98 separate federal grant programs.251 Grants
included $35 million for housing vouchers,
$14 million for school lunches, $1,303 for
Citizen Corps, and $1,715 for a bulletproof
vest program. When one looks at that aid to
Fairfax County, a number of questions come
to mind.
First, note that the larger aid programs,
housing vouchers and school aid, were origi-
nally supposed to be targeted to poor areas in
the country. But Fairfax County is one of the
wealthiest counties in the United States and
could easily afford its own anti-poverty pro-
grams, if such programs were a good idea.
Second, consider the smaller aid programs.
How many bulletproof vests can the county
buy for $1,715? How many hours of police
time were consumed by paperwork to receive
this small amount of aid? If police officer
compensation is $30 an hour, and 20 hours
were needed for paperwork, that would eat up
a third of the value of the bulletproof vest
grant. Of course, Fairfax is capable of funding
its own bulletproof vests if they are a priority
for the local police.
Fairfax County has developed a detailed
reporting structure to document the costs of
federal regulations, including aid-related
rules and other mandates. One federal regu-
lation requires that local health services be
available in various non-English languages.
Fairfax estimates that this single regulation
costs county taxpayers $350,000 per year.252
As another example, the costs to manage the
Community Development Block Grant pro-
gram in Fairfax were $644,000 in 2006. And
administering the Section 8 housing grant
program cost the county $561,000 in 2006.
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All in all, Fairfax estimates that it spent
$422 million complying with aid-related rules
and federal mandates in 2006, or more than
$400 for each resident of the county.253 Those
costs have grown at about 8 percent annually
during the past decade. In sum, federal regula-
tory intervention in state affairs is very costly,
and spending on aid as reported in the federal
budget only captures a portion of overall fed-
eral intrusion into state and local activities.
Conclusion
Under the federal aid system, about $500
billion flows into Washington each year from
taxpayers in the 50 states. The funds are allo-
cated by power brokers in Congress and rout-
ed through the federal bureaucracies. Then,
somewhat depleted, the funds are sent back
to the states coupled with thousands of
pages of federal regulations to comply with.
It is a roundabout funding system that serves
no important economic purpose. If it was
shut down, state governments and the pri-
vate sector would step in and fund those
activities that they thought were worthwhile.
During the 1970s and 1980s, government
auditors, official commissions, and many ana-
lysts determined that the aid system needed
major reforms. A 1975 GAO report was entitled
“Fundamental Changes Are Needed in Federal
Assistance to State and Local Governments.”254
Those fundamental changes were never made.
Ronald Reagan put the system on a diet for a
few years, but the core pathologies were not
addressed. Since then, hundreds more pro-
grams have been added to the system, the costs
have grown higher, and the parochial battles
over aid are bigger than ever.
The aid system thrives, not because it makes
economic sense, but because it maximizes the
political benefits of government spending. Aid
gets all levels of government involved in each
spending activity, which allows each level to
blame the others for poor service quality and
high tax burdens. The system ingeniously
“provides interest groups with multiple oppor-
tunities and access points,” as Michael Greve
notes, and creates interlocking defensive layers
that resist any cuts.255
This study has focused on the spending
pressures and bureaucracy created by aid, but
there are many other problems. The top-down
micromanagement that comes with aid
smothers policy diversity in the states. Aid
mutes beneficial tax competition between the
states. Aid destroys political accountability—
when programs fail, politicians usually point
fingers at other levels of government. The fed-
eral aid system has been called “the triumph of
expenditure without responsibility.”256
Another problem is the “overload” that aid
creates on federal decisionmaking. Each new aid
program has stretched thinner the ability of pol-
icymakers to deal with crucial national prob-
lems because they are dealing with hundreds of
local spending issues. In 1925 President Calvin
Coolidge argued that aid to the states should be
cut because it was “encumbering the national
government beyond its wisdom to comprehend,
or its ability to administer” its proper roles.257
Today, when we find out that key members of
Congress don’t understand the basics of terror-
ism or bother reading national intelligence
reports, we know that Coolidge was right.
Americans would be better off if the aid sys-
tem was greatly cut or eliminated and federal
policymakers focused on delivering a limited
range of high-quality national services such as
defense. With the coming federal budget
crunch from rising costs in Social Security and
Medicare, the aid system is an ideal place to
find budget savings. Initial reform steps
should include converting Medicaid to a block
grant to control costs and terminating hun-
dreds of lower-priority aid programs.
Cutting the aid system will require heavy
political lifting because the system is deeply
entrenched. There are tens of thousands of
state and local governments, unions, trade
associations, and other groups addicted to
the flows of dollars from Washington, and
they will try to block any reforms. Ronald
Reagan showed that aid can be cut, but actu-
ally cutting it will take a fundamental chal-
lenge from another determined and reform-
minded president.
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Appendix: 
A Portion of Presidential Executive Order 12612: Federalism
October 26, 1987
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States
of America, and in order to restore the division of governmental responsibilities between the
national government and the States that was intended by the Framers of the Constitution and
to ensure that the principles of federalism established by the Framers guide the Executive
departments and agencies in the formulation and implementation of policies, it is hereby
ordered as follows: . . .
Sec. 2. Fundamental Federalism Principles. In formulating and implementing policies that
have federalism implications, Executive departments and agencies shall be guided by the fol-
lowing fundamental federalism principles: 
(a) Federalism is rooted in the knowledge that our political liberties are best assured by lim-
iting the size and scope of the national government.
(b) The people of the States created the national government when they delegated to it
those enumerated governmental powers relating to matters beyond the competence of
the individual States. All other sovereign powers, save those expressly prohibited the
States by the Constitution, are reserved to the States or to the people. 
(c) The constitutional relationship among sovereign governments, State and national, is
formalized in and protected by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
(d) The people of the States are free, subject only to restrictions in the Constitution itself
or in constitutionally authorized Acts of Congress, to define the moral, political, and
legal character of their lives. 
(e) In most areas of governmental concern, the States uniquely possess the constitutional
authority, the resources, and the competence to discern the sentiments of the people
and to govern accordingly. In Thomas Jefferson’s words, the States are “the most com-
petent administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest bulwarks against anti-
republican tendencies.” 
(f) The nature of our constitutional system encourages a healthy diversity in the public
policies adopted by the people of the several States according to their own conditions,
needs, and desires. In the search for enlightened public policy, individual States and
communities are free to experiment with a variety of approaches to public issues. 
(g) Acts of the national government—whether legislative, executive, or judicial in nature—
that exceed the enumerated powers of that government under the Constitution violate
the principle of federalism established by the Framers. 
(h) Policies of the national government should recognize the responsibility of—and should
encourage opportunities for—individuals, families, neighborhoods, local governments,
and private associations to achieve their personal, social, and economic objectives
through cooperative effort. 
(i) In the absence of clear constitutional or statutory authority, the presumption of sovereign-
ty should rest with the individual States. Uncertainties regarding the legitimate authority of
the national government should be resolved against regulation at the national level. 
Sec. 3. Federalism Policymaking Criteria. In addition to the fundamental federalism princi-
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ples set forth in section 2, Executive departments and agencies shall adhere, to the extent per-
mitted by law, to the following criteria when formulating and implementing policies that have
federalism implications:
(a) There should be strict adherence to constitutional principles. Executive departments
and agencies should closely examine the constitutional and statutory authority sup-
porting any Federal action that would limit the policymaking discretion of the States,
and should carefully assess the necessity for such action. To the extent practicable, the
States should be consulted before any such action is implemented. Executive Order No.
12372 (“Intergovernmental Review of Federal Programs”) remains in effect for the pro-
grams and activities to which it is applicable. 
(b) Federal action limiting the policymaking discretion of the States should be taken only
where constitutional authority for the action is clear and certain and the national activ-
ity is necessitated by the presence of a problem of national scope. For the purposes of
this Order: 
(1) It is important to recognize the distinction between problems of national scope (which
may justify Federal action) and problems that are merely common to the States (which
will not justify Federal action because individual States, acting individually or together,
can effectively deal with them). 
(2) Constitutional authority for Federal action is clear and certain only when authority for
the action may be found in a specific provision of the Constitution, there is no provi-
sion in the Constitution prohibiting Federal action, and the action does not encroach
upon authority reserved to the States. 
(c) With respect to national policies administered by the States, the national government
should grant the States the maximum administrative discretion possible. Intrusive,
Federal oversight of State administration is neither necessary nor desirable. 
(d) When undertaking to formulate and implement policies that have federalism implica-
tions, Executive departments and agencies shall: 
(1) Encourage States to develop their own policies to achieve program objectives and to
work with appropriate officials in other States. 
(2) Refrain, to the maximum extent possible, from establishing uniform, national stan-
dards for programs and, when possible, defer to the States to establish standards. 
(3) When national standards are required, consult with appropriate officials and organiza-
tions representing the States in developing those standards. . . .
RONALD REAGAN
THE WHITE HOUSE
October 26, 1987.
Exec. Order No. 12612, 52 FR 41685, 1987 WL 181433 (Pres.) 
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